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SUMMARY
With the fast development of wireless networks and devices, Mobile IP is expected
to be used widely so that mobile users can access the Internet anywhere, anytime without
interruption. However, some problems, such as firewall traversal and use of private IP
addresses, restrict use of Mobile IP. The objective of this thesis is to design original schemes
that can enable a mobile node at abroad to access its home network as well as the Internet
securely and that can help Mobile IP to be used widely and commercially. Our solutions
are secure, efficient, and scalable. They can be implemented and maintained easily. In this
thesis, we mainly consider Mobile IPv4, instead of Mobile IPv6. Three research topics are
discussed. In each topic, the challenges are investigated and the new solutions are presented.
The first research topic solves the firewall traversal problems in Mobile IP. A mobile
node cannot access its firewall-protected home network if it fails the authentication by the
firewall. We propose that an IPsec tunnel be established between the firewall and the foreign
agent for firewall traversal and that an IPsec transport security association be shared by
the mobile node and a correspondent node for end-to-end security.
The second topic researches further on firewall traversal problems and investigates the
way of establishing security associations among network entities. A new security model and
a new key distribution method are developed. With the help of the security model and keys,
the firewall and the relevant network entities set up IPsec security associations to achieve
firewall traversal.
A mobile node from a private home network cannot communicate with other hosts with
its private home address when it is visiting a public foreign network. A novel and useful
solution is presented in the third research topic. We suggest that the mobile node use its
Network Access Identifier (NAI) as its identification and obtain a public home address from





With the fast development of wireless networks and devices, more and more customers
demand access to the Internet anywhere, anytime without interruption. In the Internet, an
IP address is used to identify a network attachment point of a computer, and a tuple (IP
address, port number) is employed to distinguish a connection. Whenever a mobile computer
moves from a network attachment point to another, its IP address changes, and connections
between the mobile computer and other hosts have to be stopped. For this reason, a mobile
computer needs to have a stable IP address to maintain continuous communications with
other hosts. However, a stable IP address means that a mobile computer cannot move from
one network to another, that is, a stable IP address restricts the movement of a mobile
computer. Many approaches [19, 37, 48] have been proposed to solve this mobility problem.
Among them, Mobile IP [20, 41, 37, 38, 49], in which a mobile computer utilizes two IP
addresses, successfully achieves seamless roaming. That is, in Mobile IP, although a mobile
node’s network attachment point changes because of movement, its permanent IP address
keeps the same. Therefore, the connections between the mobile node and other hosts are
not interrupted by the movement.
In this chapter, firstly we give an introduction to Mobile IP. Then we briefly describe
the research objectives and the thesis outline.
1.1 Mobile IP Overview
Because the main task of Mobile IP is to correctly address packets to mobile computers, it
is a routing protocol. Mobile IP is implemented on the network layer, so it is transparent
to upper-layer applications. In Mobile IP, each mobile computer is completely administered
by one network, and that network is called the mobile computer’s home network. Other
networks are called the mobile computer’s foreign networks. Three new network entities are
1
introduced as follows:
• Mobile Node (MN): a host that can change its network attachment point without
changing its IP address. Thus a mobile node can communicate with other hosts
without any interruption when it moves around different networks.
• Home Agent (HA): a router on a mobile node’s home network that helps the mobile
node’s registration and packet delivery.
• Foreign Agent (FA): a router on a mobile node’s foreign network that cooperates with
the mobile node’s home agent to finish registration and packet delivery.
An example of a Mobile IP scenario is shown in Figure 1. At least one home agent is
located in a home network. It is optional that one or several foreign agents be deployed in
a foreign network. Three mobile nodes, MN1, MN2, and MN3 belong to the same home
network. These mobile nodes may stay within the home network or visit foreign networks.
They may exchange packets with other correspondent nodes (CN) that are located inside as
well as outside the home network. While a mobile node works in the same way as other hosts
when it stays at home, it works differently when it visits a foreign network. Specifically,
when being away from home, a mobile node has to depend on the help of its home agent


















Figure 1: An example of a Mobile IP scenario.
In Mobile IP, to achieve mobility, each mobile node has two IP addresses. One is
permanent and used for identification of a mobile node; hence this long-term IP address is
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called the mobile node’s home address. The other IP address reflects the current location of
a mobile node. That is, whenever the mobile node changes its point of network attachment,
this address changes. Therefore, this address is temporary and used for routing. It is called
the mobile node’s care-of address. There are two types of care-of addresses. One is provided
by a foreign agent and is called a foreign agent care-of address. The other is acquired by a
mobile node itself through some external means and is called a co-located care-of address.
For example, in Figure 1, the mobile node M1 may get a co-located care-of address from
a DHCP [12, 27] server and the mobile node M2 may get a care-of address from a foreign
agent.
In Mobile IP, it takes three steps for a mobile node to achieve seamless roaming, i.e.,
agent discovery, registration, and tunnelling. In other words, a mobile node finds mobile
agents, registers with its home agent, and then communicates with other correspondent
nodes. In the following, we explain these three steps in detail.
1.1.1 Agent Discovery
Both home agents and foreign agents are required to periodically broadcast agent adver-
tisement messages.
A foreign agent uses agent advertisement messages to have its services and care-of ad-
dresses publicly known. Upon receipt of such a message, a mobile node compares this
message with the previous agent advertisement message that it receives to detect whether
it still stays within the same foreign network or already moves to another one. If the mobile
node finds out that it is visiting a new foreign network, it needs to send a registration request
message to its home agent.
While a foreign agent may claim to be too busy to serve mobile nodes, a home agent
has to be available to its mobile nodes at any time. To avoid overload, usually there are
several home agents in a home network, and each is in charge of almost an equal number of
mobile nodes. With the help of an agent advertisement message broadcast by a home agent,
a mobile node can determine whether it already has returned to its home network or is still
visiting a foreign network. If the mobile node is back home, it is required to deregister with
3
its home agent.
A mobile node is allowed to send an agent solicitation message if it does not want to
wait for mobile agents’ advertisement messages.
Since Mobile IP assumes that any agent that broadcasts its services is a mobility agent,
it is unnecessary to put an authentication part into agent advertisement and solicitation
messages. In the Internet, although some hackers may pretend to be mobility agents and
attract mobile nodes to use their services, registration messages, which are explained in the
following section, can protect mobile nodes against vulnerability.
1.1.2 Registration
When a mobile node receives an advertisement message broadcast by a mobility agent, it
can determine its current location and decide whether it needs to send a registration request
message to its home agent. Under the following conditions a mobile node should request a
registration.
• When a mobile node just visits a new foreign network, it is required to inform its home
agent of its current location and possibly to request services from a foreign agent.
• When a current registration time nearly expires, a mobile node should register to
renew a binding.
• When a mobile node returns to its home network, it should deregister with its home
agent so that its previous bindings can be deleted.
A mobile node may send a registration request to its home agent directly or through a
foreign agent. Because a foreign agent is used in our research, we only discuss the latter
case in the following.
The mobile node initiates a registration request and sends that to the foreign agent.
The foreign agent plays a passive role in the registration procedure [41]. On receipt of a
registration request message, the foreign agent checks its validity. If the message is invalid,
the foreign agent discards it and sends a denial reply to the mobile node. Otherwise, the
foreign agent finds the address of the home agent from the registration request message,
4
puts that address as the destination, and then forwards the registration request message to
the home agent.
The home agent plays a reactive role in the registration procedure [41]. If the home
agent receives an invalid registration request relayed by the foreign agent, it rejects the
registration request and returns a registration reply message indicating the reason for error.
However, if the registration request satisfies the validity check, the home agent stores the
current care-of address of the mobile node and updates the record of the mobile node’s
mobility bindings. Then the home agent is required to send a registration reply message
back.
The foreign agent needs to check the validity of a registration reply message sent from
the home agent. If the registration reply message does not pass the validity check, the
foreign agent discards the reply message silently. At the same time, it sends a registration
reply to the mobile node to notify it of the denial reason. But if the foreign agent receives
a valid registration reply from the home agent, it modifies its visitor list for the successful
registration of the mobile node and relays the reply message to the mobile node. Then the
mobile node receives the reply message and completes registration.
Mobile IP uses the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [44] instead of the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) [45] for transporting registration messages. One reason for this
choice is that Mobile IP does not need services provided by TCP, such as windowing,
congestion control, or flow control. Another reason is that TCP performs poorly when
packets are dropped as a result of high link error rates in wireless networks [4].
Since a mobile node is more vulnerable in wireless networks than in wired networks, it
is very important to protect communications between a mobile node and its home agent
against malicious users. Therefore, it is required for a mobile node to share a security
association with its home agent in Mobile IP. With the security association, the mobile
node and its home agent can authenticate registration messages exchanged between them.
Furthermore, if a mobile node shares a security association with a foreign agent, it can
trust the services provided by the foreign agent. Similarly, if a home agent has shared a
security association with a foreign agent, it can determine whether messages sent from the
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foreign agent have been modified by malicious users. However, because the administrative
domain of a foreign agent is usually different from that of a mobile node and a home agent,
in Mobile IP, it is optional for the foreign agent to have respective security associations with
the mobile node and the home agent.
With respective security associations, a mobile node, a home agent, and a foreign agent
may generate authentication extensions and append them to registration messages. In
Mobile IP, there are three authentication extensions, i.e., the mobile-home authentication
extension, the mobile-foreign authentication extension, and the foreign-home authentication
extension. Based on the reasons explained above, the first authentication extension is
required in all registration messages, and the other two are optional.
1.1.3 Tunneling
If a mobile node stays at its home network, the IP protocol is followed for packet delivery
between the mobile node and other correspondent nodes. However, if a mobile node leaves
its home, the Mobile IP protocol is used for transmitting packets. Because a foreign agent is
deployed in our research, in the following we only introduce how data packets are delivered
with the deployment of a foreign agent.
In Mobile IP, a tunnel is established from the address of the home agent to the care-of
address of the mobile node for packet delivery. An IP packet is encapsulated at the entry
point of the tunnel, i.e., the home agent, and then decapsulated at the exit point of the
tunnel, i.e., the foreign agent. Both the home agent and the foreign agent are required to
support tunneling packets using IP-in-IP encapsulation.
In IP-in-IP encapsulation, a new IP header is inserted before an original packet to form
a new IP packet, shown in Figure 2. Therefore, the source address and the destination
address of the new IP packet are used for routing from the entry point of the tunnel to the
exit point.
A mobile node away from home may communicate with a correspondent node after
registration. As shown in Figure 3, the home agent attracts packets destined for the mobile
node. Then the home agent tunnels these packets to the foreign agent by encapsulating
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Figure 2: IP-in-IP encapsulation [37, 41].
them with new IP headers. In the new IP headers, the home agent’s address is used as the
source and the mobile node’s care-of address as the destination. These packets exit from the
tunnel at the foreign agent. In other words, once receiving the packets, the foreign agent
removes the new IP headers added by the home agent. Then the foreign agent transmits








Figure 3: Packet delivery from a correspondent node to a mobile node [37, 41].
In the opposite direction, packet transmission may follow the IP routing, that is, the
mobile node puts its home address as the source and sends packets directly to the cor-
respondent node. However, because the mobile node is visiting a foreign network, the
packets’ source address, i.e., the mobile node’s home address, is not topologically correct
[34]. Currently, many routers check packets’ source addresses besides destination addresses
to prevent various attacks. They usually drop packets that do not have topologically correct
source addresses because the routers doubt that these packets are from IP spoofing hosts.
Therefore, a reverse tunnel [34] has been proposed to solve this problem. A reverse tunnel
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is established from the mobile node’s care-of address to the home agent. Hence, a tunnel
from the home agent to the mobile node’s care-of address is also called a forward tunnel. It
is assumed that the same configuration is used for both the forward tunnel and the reverse
tunnel.
If a reverse tunnel is used, as shown in Figure 4, packets with the mobile node’s home
address as the source are put into the reverse tunnel by the foreign agent. Thus, in the
encapsulated packets, the new source is the mobile node’s care-of address and the new
destination is the home agent’s address. At the exit of the reverse tunnel, the home agent









Figure 4: Packet delivery from a mobile node to a correspondent node with a reverse tunnel.
Some security problems might arise out of reverse tunnels. For example, if a foreign
agent does not have respective security associations with a mobile node and a home agent,
a malicious node might hijack the existing reverse tunnel and re-direct the tunnel to other
nodes [34]. Therefore, the security associations shared between the foreign agent and the
mobile node and those shared between the foreign agent and the home agent are very useful.
1.2 Research Objectives and Solutions
Although Mobile IP can provide seamless roaming services, some problems, such as firewall
traversal, prevent Mobile IP from being used widely. The objective of this thesis is to develop
original schemes that can enable a mobile node at abroad to access its home network as
well as the Internet securely and that can help Mobile IP to be used widely and efficiently.
Our solutions are intended to be implemented and maintained easily. In this thesis, we
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mainly discuss Mobile IPv4 [41], instead of Mobile IPv6 [20]. Three research topics are
investigated. In the following, each topic is briefly explained.
1.2.1 Mobile IP Secure Firewall Traversal with the Deployment of Foreign
Agents
If a mobile node’s home network is firewall-protected, the mobile node at abroad cannot
access its home network without successful authentication. Therefore, the home agent can
neither know the current location of the mobile node nor tunnel packets to it. To some
extent, the mobile node loses contact with its home agent and other correspondent nodes.
In our research, we consider the network scenario that, in Mobile IPv4, a mobile node
away from its firewall-protected home network obtains a care-of address from a foreign agent.
Our objective is to enable the mobile node to communicate with its home agent and other
correspondent nodes that are located inside the home network behind the firewall. IPsec
mechanisms [26] are applied on network entities. Specifically, an IPsec tunnel is established
between the firewall and the foreign agent for firewall traversal, and a transport security
association is shared between the mobile node and a correspondent node for end-to-end
security. This approach can be extended to the network scenario in which foreign agents
are deployed hierarchically.
Our solution is secure and scalable. The security association shared between the mobile
node and a correspondent node does not need to be refreshed for the mobile node’s handoffs.
1.2.2 Secure Firewall Traversal in the Mobile IP AAA System
Mobile IP is only a mobility technology. Mobile IP can be used commercially if it is combined
with services of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) [13]. However, if
a firewall is used to protect the home domain of a mobile node, the firewall prevents the
mobile node from accessing the home domain without successful authentication. Thus the
mobile node gets lost.
IPsec mechanisms can be used on network entities, similar to the first research topic
explained in Section 1.2.1. Nevertheless, in the first research topic, the way of establishing
security relationships is not investigated. In this research topic, a novel security model is
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proposed. The essential security associations shared by the network entities are illustrated
in the security model. Moreover, a new key is suggested to be generated and a new method
for key distribution is presented. The firewall and the relevant network entities use these
essential security associations and these keys to set up IPsec security associations so that
messages originally sent from the mobile node can pass through the firewall.
1.2.3 Mobile IP Use of Private Addresses in an RSIP Home Network
Because of a shortage of IP addresses and burden of routing overhead [46], many organiza-
tions apply private addresses in their internal networks. If the home network of a mobile
node uses private addresses, the mobile node away from home does not have a public home
address to uniquely identify itself in a public network. Thus, the mobile node cannot com-
municate with other correspondent nodes when it stays away from its home network.
In the network scenario that we discuss, the home network of a mobile node is a private
network and the mobile node obtains its care-of address from a foreign agent in a public
foreign network. Our approach can enable the mobile node to communicate with a corre-
spondent node when it is at abroad. In more detail, the mobile node uses its Network Access
Identifier (NAI) [1] to uniquely identify itself in a public network. When the mobile node
enters a foreign network, if it does not have a public home address by that time, it puts its
NAI and the IP address 0.0.0.0 to the registration request message and sends the message
to the home agent. The home agent assigns a public home address to the mobile node.
When the mobile node communicates with a correspondent node that is located inside the
home network, to prevent private addresses from being accessed in the public network, an
additional IP header is necessary to encapsulate an original data packet. If a firewall is
used to protect the private home network, our scheme can also be extended to achieve for
the mobile node to get access to its home network.
Our solution neither uses any private addresses in the public network nor brings any
additional security holes.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis includes four chapters.
10
Chapter 2 focuses on the solution to firewall traversal in Mobile IP. Because IPsec
mechanisms are applied on network entities, an overview of IPsec is given. After the firewall
traversal problems and related work are analyzed, the network scenario and assumptions
used for our discussion are illustrated. We argue for the advantage and necessities of foreign
agent deployment. Then, we present our firewall traversal solution in detail and extend the
solution to the network scenario of hierarchical foreign agents. Analysis of our solution is
also given in this chapter.
The approach to the firewall traversal in the Mobile IP AAA system is presented in
Chapter 3. After the Mobile IP AAA system is introduced, challenges and related work are
investigated. Then we go into details about our design, including the new security model,
the key generation and distribution, and control message flow.
Chapter 4 gives the detailed scheme for using private addresses in Mobile IP. Because
an Realm Specific IP (RSIP) [8] gateway is used in the network scenario for our discussion,
an outline of RSIP is given. After we analyze the problems for use of private addresses in
Mobile IP and related work, we specify the principles, objectives and considerations of our
design protocols. The detailed communication procedures are illustrated with figures. We
also extend our solution to the situation that a firewall is placed at the entrance of a private
home network. Our solution is evaluated before the end of this chapter.
We summarize our research contributions in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER II
MOBILE IP SECURE FIREWALL TRAVERSAL WITH
THE DEPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN AGENTS
2.1 Problems of Mobile IP Firewall Traversal
Nowadays, there are numerous attacks in the Internet. Since firewalls can monitor traffic to
and from internal networks and only allow authorized traffic to pass, they are an effective
tool to keep attacks outside internal networks and to minimize the danger [5, 52]. Thus
many organizations install firewalls to protect their internal networks against attacks from
the Internet. In Mobile IP, because mobile nodes roam over the Internet and use wireless
links for communications, such characteristics provide more opportunities for hackers, and
home networks are more vulnerable to attacks. So it seems that the deployment of firewalls
is a good way to protect home networks. Contradictorily, firewalls bring problems to use
of Mobile IP. Specifically, if a mobile node’s home network is firewall-protected, when the
mobile node is at abroad, it cannot contact its home agent unless it can be authenticated
by the firewall successfully. Without access to its home agent, the mobile node cannot
complete registrations. In other words, the home agent cannot know the current location
of the mobile node and tunnel the packets destined for the mobile node, which leads that
other correspondent nodes cannot communicate with the mobile node. Consequently the
most significant advantage of Mobile IP, seamless roaming, is shadowed by intervention of
firewalls.
2.2 Overview of IPsec
Because many approaches for solving the firewall traversal problems use IPsec, in this section
we give an overview of IPsec.
IP security (IPsec) [26] is security mechanisms that are implemented on the network
layer. Because IPsec authenticates and/or encrypts all traffic on the network layer, the
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security of upper-layer applications can be ensured. Since IPsec is below the transport layer,
upper-layer applications are not affected by its implementation. IPsec is also transparent
to end users, so end users do not need to learn IPsec mechanisms.
To achieve services of encryption and authentication in IPsec, a security association
(SA) between a sender and a receiver is necessary. The SA is unidirectional. Therefore,
to achieve a secure two-way communication between two hosts, two security associations
are needed. Three parameters together can uniquely identify a security association. These
parameters are Security Parameters Index (SPI), IP Destination Address and Security Pro-
tocol Identifier [23, 52]. Whenever one of these three parameters changes, a sender and a
receiver have to re-negotiate the security associations between them. For example, if the
receiver changes its IP address, a new security association is required to be re-established.
Two protocols, Authentication Header (AH) [24] and Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP) [25], are used to provide security services. The Authentication Header protocol uses
a message authentication code (MAC) to support security services of authentication and
data integrity. Thus, a sender and a receiver must share a secret key. With the help of
the secret key, the receiver can authenticate the sender and detect modification of data
packets. In addition, the Authentication Header protocol can guard against IP spoofing
and replay attacks. The Encapsulating Security Payload protocol supports confidentiality
besides the services provided by AH. Similar to AH, ESP also requires that a secret key be
shared between a sender and a receiver. The sender uses this shared key to encrypt payload
of data packets so that no one but the receiver can know the information contained in the
data packets.
Both AH and ESP support two mode: transport mode and tunnel mode [23, 52]. Trans-
port mode only protects data from upper-layers. That is, transport mode primarily gives
protection for the payload of IP packets, and it does not ensure the security of IP header,
as shown in Figure 5. Transport mode is generally used to achieve end-to-end security.
AH in transport mode supports authentication for the payload of IP packets, and ESP in
transport mode may encrypt the payload.
Different from transport mode, tunnel mode protects an entire packet. Firstly, an entire
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Figure 5: Packet formats of IPsec transport mode [23, 52].
packet, including the IP header and the payload, is authenticated and/or encrypted. Then,
the entire packet is encapsulated with a new IP header, as shown in Figure 6. Because the
original packet is encapsulated with a new IP header in tunnel mode, the packet overhead
in tunnel mode is larger than that in transport mode.
original IP header payload
original IP header payloadIPsec
original packet
tunnel mode new IP header
Figure 6: Packet formats of IPsec tunnel mode [23, 52].
In IPsec tunnel mode, the source and destination in a new IP header are two end points
of a tunnel. When a packet traverses in this tunnel, no router along the path can examine
the original packet. Usually gateways located between an internal network and the Internet
are end points of a tunnel. Hosts behind the gateways may send unprotected packets. For
example, in Figure 7(a), the gateways G1 and G2 are respectively located on the borders
of two networks, and the Internet is between them. The hosts A and B are not installed
security software to protect packets that they send. In order for the traffic exchanged
between host A and host B to securely pass through the Internet, an IPsec tunnel is set up
between the two gateways. In an original packet sent by the host A, the source address is
the IP address of host A and the destination is the host B (Figure 7(b)). Before the gateway
G1 sends the packet, it uses IPsec mechanisms to protect the entire original packet . Then
the gateway G1 encapsulates the packet with a new IP header. Different from the original
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IP header, the source in the new IP header is the address of the gateway G1 and the
destination is the gateway G2 (Figure 7(c)). Because of the shared secret between the
gateway G1 and G2, the gateway G2 can release the packet from the IPsec tunnel and
deliver the original packet (Figure 7(b)) to the host B.












Figure 7: An example for use of IPsec tunnel mode: (a) network framework; (b) a packet
sent by host A; (c) a packet sent by gateway G1.
2.3 Related Work
In recent years, the problems of firewall traversal by a mobile node have been investigated,
and several solutions have been proposed.
Zao et al.[58, 57] point out that a firewall may also work as a mobility agent, that is, the
functions of a firewall and a mobility agent may be combined together. Similarly, Mink et
al. [32] propose that a gateway be inserted into a network’s firewall and that this gateway
use the security association shared between itself and the mobile node to authenticate the
mobile node. Although these approaches [32, 58, 57] make perfect sense, there exist some
practical problems. Currently many firewalls that have already been installed widely have no
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function of mobility agents. The cost is very high to upgrade these firewalls with mobility
features. This kind of upgrade brings the issue of interoperability when technologies of
mobility agents and firewalls are from different vendors [3]. Moreover, from the security
point of view, it is suggested that firewalls run as few programs as possible to avoid security
flaws [5]. As a result, there may be some potential security holes on firewalls if firewalls
also act as mobility agents.
Because of characteristics of IPsec [26], many solutions [9, 14, 36, 55] focus on IPsec
and employ it to solve the firewall traversal problems. In more detail, one IPsec tunnel
is established between the mobile node’s co-located care-of address and the firewall, and
one Mobile IP tunnel is inserted inside the IPsec tunnel. The IPsec tunnel achieves data
packets to pass through the firewall, and the Mobile IP tunnel helps data packets to transfer
to and from the mobile node. Although it is very useful to apply IPsec mechanisms to
network entities, these solutions [9, 14, 36, 55] still have some drawbacks. Firstly, all
of them [9, 14, 36, 55] assume that the internal network is secure, hence only plaintext
messages are transferred between the home agent and the firewall. However, it is well
known that this assumption is not achievable in the real world because many hackers stay
behind the firewall and attack the internal network. Therefore, it is not secure to use only
plaintext messages in the internal network, especially for the security-sensitive messages.
Secondly, since the IPsec tunnel terminates at the firewall, the firewall can read everything
transferred between the two end users. In other words, no end-to-end security is achieved.
Nowadays, end-to-end security becomes more and more important in many areas, such as
e-commerce, where it is required that no third party know any secret information. Even
worse, if the firewall is compromised, there may exist a potential “man-in-the-middle” threat
and the firewall may modify messages exchanged between the end users. Thirdly, in these
solutions [9, 14, 36, 55], the mobile node employs a co-located care-of address when it is
away from home. In IPsec mechanisms, IP Destination Address is one of three parameters
to identify a security association. As a result, whenever the mobile node obtains a new
co-located care-of address, the IPsec tunnel security association has to be refreshed, which
degrades the handoff performance [3]. Re-negotiation of security associations also costs
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power consumption and computation resources that are limited for a mobile node.
The basic reason that a security association needs to be refreshed during movement in
above solutions [9, 14, 36, 55] is that IPsec mechanisms are applied after Mobile IP en-
capsulation [6]. The following solutions [56, 6] apply IPsec over Mobile IP to achieve no
re-negotiation of security associations during handoffs, but they have some other disadvan-
tages.
Vaarala and Klovning [56] proposes a new topology so that a mobile node can commu-
nicate with its firewall-protected home agent. In this topology there are two home agents.
One is located in the internal network and is called i-HA. The other is located in the
external network and is called x-HA. In order to detect itself location, the mobile node si-
multaneously sends two registration requests to i-HA and x-HA respectively. If the mobile
node is within the internal network, it follows standard Mobile IP protocol. Otherwise, it
registers its care-of address with the x-HA, establishes a VPN tunnel between itself and the
firewall, and then registers the VPN tunnel inner address as its care-of address with the
i-HA. As explained above, because another layer of Mobile IP is employed under IPsec, no
re-negotiation for IPsec security associations is required whenever the mobile node obtains
a new care-of address. Nevertheless, the solution of dual home agents may bring redirection
attacks [56]. Like solutions in above proposals [9, 14, 36, 55], the IPsec tunnel still termi-
nates at the firewall, instead of i-HA, accordingly, there is no end-to-end security between
the mobile node and i-HA. In addition, the employment of an external home agent also has
some shortcomings. Firstly, the total cost is increased. Secondly, the external home agent
is under various attacks in the Internet and may be easily compromised because it is outside
the firewall. Finally, the two separate registration requests sent from the mobile node to
i-HA and x-HA increase network traffic load if the handoff is frequent.
Berioli and Trotta [6] also apply IPsec mechanisms after Mobile IP, that is, a Mobile
IP tunnel encapsulates an IPsec tunnel. To achieve seamless handoffs, a mobile node uses
its home address, not care-of address, for the IPsec tunnel establishment. However, this
solution has some requirements on home network topology and firewall configuration [6].
In more detail, it requires the home agent be reachable directly from outside. Therefore,
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the home agent cannot be protected by the firewall and may be attacked by hackers. The
firewall has to be configured particularly so that the traffic destined for the mobile node is
forced to pass through the VPN gateway before the home agent. Furthermore, the Mobile
IP data traffic is not protected by any security mechanism on network layer, thus redirection
attacks are possible. Also there is no end-to-end security achievement in this solution.
2.4 Network Framework Model and Assumptions
The network framework shown in Figure 8 is used for our discussion. A firewall is used
to protect a mobile node’s home network from external attacks. The firewall is the only
entry point to the home network so that all traffic must go through it, no matter whether
the traffic is from outside to inside or vice versa. The firewall only allows packets with
successful authentication to enter the home network and drops other unqualified packets.
Although the home network is firewall-protected, we do not assume that the home network
is secure, i.e., some hackers may stay behind the firewall. In the real world, normally there
are some firewalls installed within the home network for better security protection, but we












Figure 8: Network framework for firewall traversal in Mobile IP.
Unlike architectures in the solutions of [6] and [56], in our discussion, the home agent is
located behind the firewall in order not to be exposed to various Internet attacks. Moreover,
there is no external home agent. Different from the approaches in [32, 58, 57], in our scenario,
the home agent and the firewall run on separate physical machines to avoid the potential
security flaws and the interoperability problems that we point out in Section 2.3.
Correspondent nodes may be placed either inside or outside the mobile node’s home
network. Here we only consider the situation that the correspondent nodes are located
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behind the firewall of the home network. Because the mobile node and the correspondent
node belong to the same network, it is natural to assume that they can be pre-configured
to share a security association.
A mobile node can move freely and seamlessly within its home network as well as abroad.
When the mobile node is at home, it can communicate with its home agent and other
hosts behind the firewall directly. Nevertheless, when it enters a foreign network, unlike
discussions in those solutions [9, 14, 36, 55], the mobile node obtains a care-of address from
a foreign agent. In addition, we assume that the foreign agent is the default router of the
mobile node.
If the foreign network is protected by a firewall as well, it is not reasonable to allow
a mobile node to stay behind this firewall because the mobile node is an external node to
the foreign network. The main function of a foreign agent is to relay messages to and from
mobile nodes, that is, it always deals with external nodes. Therefore it is appropriate to
place a foreign agent outside its network firewall. In a word, both the mobile node and
the foreign agent should be located outside the firewall of the foreign network. So in our
discussion, the firewall of the foreign network, if there is one, is omitted in Fig. 8. Certainly
both the mobile node and the foreign agent are require installing some security software to
protect themselves from attacks. For simplicity reason, the case of multiple firewalls is not
considered here. As a result, in our scenario, when the mobile node is away from home, it
only needs to traverse the firewall that protects its home network.
2.5 Deployment of Foreign Agents
As explained in Section 1.1, two different procedures for registration are defined in Mobile
IP [41, 37]. One is that a mobile node obtains its care-of address from a foreign agent and
sends the registration request to its home agent via the foreign agent. The other is that a
mobile node acquires its care-of address from some external services such as Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [12, 27] and registers this temporary address with its home
agent directly. These two procedures are used in different environments. In our discussion,
a foreign agent is used to relay messages for the mobile node because such deployment has
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some advantages and necessities.
The most direct benefit for using foreign agents is to save the number of IP addresses
[41], that is, several mobile nodes can share one IP address. With the fast growth in the
number of the mobile nodes, for the limited IPv4 address space, this benefit is significant.
In addition, foreign agents are good for not only smooth handoffs to reduce packet losses
but also regionalized registration to decrease network traffic [37].
In the real world, when mobile nodes enter a foreign network, they have to use resources
of the foreign network to continue their network connectivity. The foreign network needs
some mechanisms to protect its security and resources [40]. In more detail, the foreign
network needs firstly to verify the identity of mobile nodes, then to authorize only legal
users to access its network resources, and finally to send bills to those legal mobile nodes to
collect payments. Consequently, it is necessary to employ a foreign agent to complete this
important work.
On the other hand, a foreign agent is capable to accomplish this task. With the help of
the authentication extensions in the registration messages, i.e., mobile-home, mobile-foreign
and foreign-home, the foreign agent can successfully authenticate a mobile node and make
an authorization decision. Because of the default router assumption described in Section
2.4, i.e., all traffic to and from a mobile node must pass through the foreign agent, the
foreign agent can monitor the usage of network resources by the mobile node and calculate
a bill. From the security point of view, if the foreign agent finds something abnormal, for
example, the extraordinary usage of network resources by the mobile node, the foreign agent
can disallow the mobile node to access the foreign network. Although the foreign agent can
examine network traffic exchanged with the mobile node, in our solution, it cannot read
any security-sensitive data. Hence the mobile node can still keep the information secret.
Next we explain this point in more detail.
2.6 Firewall Traversal Solution
Because IPsec [26] is implemented on the network layer and it is transparent to applications,
we use IPsec to solve the problems. There are two modes in IPsec, transport mode and
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tunnel mode. In this section, we show how we apply these two modes to achieve firewall
traversal as well as end-to-end security. Two security protocols are provided in IPsec,
Authentication Header (AH) [24] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [25]. We
choose ESP for encryption and authentication services.
When a mobile node is away from home, it firstly registers the new care-of address with
its home agent and then resumes data exchanges with a correspondent node. We explain our
approach in detail according to this procedure. In each step, we describe cooperation of the
network entities, i.e., the mobile node, the foreign agent, the home agent, the firewall and
the correspondent node. We also illustrate packets transmitted among these entities. The
shaded portion in the packet formats indicates encrypted data. Before the detail description
of our solution, for the convenience, the abbreviations shown in the figures of the packet
formats are listed as follows:
• MN : the home address of the mobile node;
• COA: the foreign agent care-of address of the mobile node;
• FA: the IP address of the foreign agent;
• HA: the IP address of the home agent;
• FW : the IP address of the firewall;
• CN : the IP address of the correspondent node.
2.6.1 Registration Procedure
As explained in Section 1.1.2, Mobile IP itself provides security protection for the registra-
tion messages to prevent malicious users from disrupting normal communications between a
mobile node and its home agent [41, 37]. Particularly, in the registration messages, Identifi-
cation field is used for prevention of replay attack, and three authentication extensions are
used for origin authentication and data integrity. Among the authentication extensions, the
mobile-home authentication extension is required, and the other two, i.e., the mobile-foreign
authentication extension and the foreign-home authentication extension, are optional. Thus
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the registration messages provide themselves authentication services. Encryption provides
confidentiality services. Since there is no security-sensitive data in the registration mes-
sages, it is not necessary to encrypt them. Optionally, the mobile node may encrypt the
registration messages with the key shared between itself and the foreign agent to keep the
registration messages from being read by other hosts but its foreign agent.
However, the mobile node cannot be authenticated by the firewall, therefore the regis-
tration request messages cannot pass through the firewall. IPsec security mechanisms are
needed for firewall traversal. If the mobile node establishes an IPsec tunnel with the firewall,
the foreign agent cannot process the registration messages, which breaks the requirement
defined in Mobile IP [41]. As a result, it is appropriate to establish an IPsec tunnel between
the foreign agent and the firewall (Fig. 9). Specifically, on receipt of the registration re-
quest (Fig. 10(a)) from the mobile node, the foreign agent processes it to form a new packet
(Fig. 10(b)) and then puts that into the IPsec tunnel (Fig. 10(c)). The firewall decrypts
and authenticates the packet (Fig. 10(c)). If the authentication is successful, the firewall
relays the registration request (Fig. 10(b)) to the home agent. For the reverse direction,








Figure 9: Establishment of an IPsec tunnel between the firewall and the foreign agent for
registration.
2.6.2 Data Exchanges between the Mobile Node and the Correspondent Node
The mobile node can communicate with a correspondent node after registration. Although
one IPsec tunnel has been already established between the foreign agent and the firewall
during the registration period, it cannot achieve end-to-end security. Since transport mode









Figure 10: Pakcet formats for registration request: (a) request between the mobile node and
foreign agent; (b) request processed by the foreign agent; (c) request between the foreign








Figure 11: Packet formats for registration reply: (a) reply between the home agent and the
firewall; (b) reply between the firewall and the foreign agent; (c) reply between the foreign
agent and the mobile node.
node and the correspondent node. As our assumption written in Section 2.4, the mobile
node and the correspondent node share security associations, so transport mode ESP can be
used to encrypt data packets transferred between them. Briefly, in our solution, tunnel mode
is applied between the firewall and the foreign agent for firewall traversal, and transport
mode is used between the mobile node and the correspondent node for end-to-end security
(Fig. 12).
For a packet sent from the correspondent node to the mobile node, it needs to traverse
the forward tunnel as well as the IPsec tunnel (Figure 13). In more detail, when the











Figure 12: Security association establishment for Mobile IP data transfer.
according to the transport mode ESP (Fig. 14(a)). On the basis of Mobile IP [41, 37], the
home agent intercepts the packet arriving for the mobile node. The packet is encapsulated
with a new IP header and inserted to the Mobile IP forward tunnel (Fig. 14(b)). Because
the packet’s destination is outside the home network, the firewall puts it into the IPsec
tunnel by encrypting the entire packet and then encapsulating it with another IP header
(Fig. 14(c)). When the foreign agent receives the packet (Fig. 14(c)), firstly it strips off
the outmost IP header, decrypts the remainder of the packet and gets the forward-tunneled
packet (Fig. 14(b)). Then the foreign agent removes another IP header added by the
home agent and recovers the original packet (Fig. 14(a)). The foreign agent cannot see
any information contained in the packet’s payload because it does not know the security
association shared between the mobile node and the correspondent node. The original
packet (Fig. 14(a)) is then forwarded to the mobile node.
As pointed out in Section 1.1, the mobile node can deliver data packets to the corre-
spondent node directly or through a reverse tunnel [34].
We discuss the simpler case first, i.e., data delivery without a reverse tunnel. In this
situation, only one tunnel, i.e., IPsec tunnel, is needed to pass through by a packet sent from
the mobile node to the correspondent node, as shown in Figure 12. The entire transport-
layer segment of a packet is encrypted by the mobile node (Fig. 15(a)). Because the
packet needs to pass through the firewall, the foreign agent encrypts the packet and then
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Figure 14: Packet formats for data sent from a correspondent node to a mobile node: (a)
packet sent by the correspondent node; (b) packet sent by the home agent; (c) packet sent
by the firewall.
termination of the IPsec tunnel, the firewall processes the packet according to the security
association shared with the foreign agent and recovers the inner packet (Fig. 15(a)). Then
the inner packet (Fig. 15(a)) is received by the correspondent node.
MN->CN ESP hdr Upper Layer Payload
(a)
MN->CN ESP hdrFA->FW ESP hdr
(b)
Upper Layer Payload
Figure 15: Packet formats for data sent from a mobile node to a correspondent node
without a reverse tunnel: (a) packet sent by the mobile node; (b) packet sent by the foreign
agent.
When the mobile node uses a reverse tunnel to transmit a data packet, the whole
procedure is just opposite to that of packet delivery from the correspondent node to the
mobile node (Figure 16). Particularly, the encrypted packet (Fig. 17(a)) enters the reverse
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tunnel and leaves for the home agent (Fig. 17(b)). The foreign agent secures the packet
and tunnels it to the firewall (Fig. 17(c)). The firewall decapsulates the packet, reveals the
reverse-tunneled packet (Fig. 17(b)) and then relays that to the home agent. After being
removed another IP header used for reverse tunneling, the packet (Fig. 17(a)) is transferred
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Figure 16: Packet delivery from a mobile node to a correspondent node with a reverse
tunnel.
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Figure 17: Packet formats for data sent from a mobile node to a correspondent node with a
reverse tunnel: (a) packet sent by the mobile node; (b) packet sent from the care-of address;
(c) packet sent by the foreign agent.
2.7 Firewall Traversal for Regional Registration
If a mobile node visits a foreign domain that is far from its home network, the registration
delay may be long. To reduce the registration delay and the number of registration messages
to the home network, regional registration [16] has been proposed. This situation is a special
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case in Mobile IP. In this section, first we introduce regional registration, then we discuss
how to apply our solution explained in Section 2.6 to this special case.
2.7.1 Overview of Regional Registration
In regional registration, foreign agents are organized hierarchically in a foreign domain,
as shown in Figure 18 [16]. One new network entities, gateway foreign agent (GFA), is
introduced. A GFA is a foreign agent and its IP address is publicly routable. Typically the
GFA is located at the top of the foreign agents’ hierarchies. Two new registration messages,
regional registration request and regional registration reply, are required when a mobile node
changes its network attachment point within the same foreign domain. In the following, we
briefly explain how a mobile node completes a home registration and a regional registration










Figure 18: Hierarchical foreign agents in Mobile IP.
When a mobile node first enters a foreign domain, it is required to report its new care-of
address to its home agent. From an agent advertisement message, the mobile node knows
the GFA’s address. It puts that address into care-of address field in a registration request
message and then sends the request message to the closest foreign agent. The foreign
agent processes the registration request message and forwards that to the GFA. The GFA
records the address of the foreign agent that relays the request message. It is the GFA that
relays the registration request message to the home agent. The home agent stores the GFA
address as the mobile node’s care-of address and sends a registration reply message to the
GFA. When the GFA receives the registration reply message, it updates its visitor list and
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forwards the reply message to the foreign agent that relays the corresponding registration
request message. Finally the reply message is delivered to the mobile node.
Because the GFA address is used as the mobile node’s care-of address, it is not necessary
to inform the home agent if the mobile node moves around several foreign networks that are
supervised by the same GFA. Under this situation, the mobile node only needs to register
locally. This is the reason that regional registration can reduce the number of signaling
messages to the home network and reduce registration delay. In regional registration, se-
curity associations are shared between a mobile node and a GFA to provide authentication
and integrity services.
When the mobile node changes foreign agents under the same GFA, it sends a regional
registration request message. Upon receiving the regional registration request message, the
foreign agent checks whether the mobile node is already in its visitor list. If the mobile
node is a new visitor, the foreign agent passes the regional registration request to the GFA.
The GFA stores the mobile node’s new network attachment point and sends a regional
registration reply message back. The regional registration reply message is delivered to the
mobile node via the new foreign agent. The regional registration procedure is completed.
After a home registration or a regional registration, a mobile node may continue to
communicate with other correspondent nodes. Packets sent from a correspondent node
arrive at the GFA by passing through a forward tunnel. Then the packets are routed from
the GFA to the mobile node via a foreign agent. Packets sent by the mobile node are
transmitted to the GFA. Then the packets may be delivered to the correspondent node
directly or through a reverse tunnel.
2.7.2 Firewall Traversal Solution for Regional Registration
The scenario that we discuss here is shown in Figure 19. The home network of a mobile
node is protected by a firewall. The mobile node is visiting a foreign domain that supports
regional registration. The mobile node faces the problems, i.e., how it can pass through
the firewall and keep its packets securely. In the following we describe how our solution












Figure 19: Regional registration scenario with a firewall protecting the home network.
Because all traffic exchanged between the mobile node’s home network and the foreign
domain must pass through the firewall and the GFA, we suggest that one IPsec tunnel
be established between the firewall and the GFA. It is unnecessary to set up an IPsec
tunnel between the firewall to each foreign agent. To achieve end-to-end security, the
transport security associations are still required to be shared between the mobile node and













Figure 20: Firewall traversal solution for regional registration situation.
When the mobile node needs a home registration, a registration request message is sent
by the mobile node and routed to the GFA. The GFA inserts the registration request to the
IPsec tunnel. At the other end point of the tunnel, the firewall releases the request message
and relays that to the home agent. The home agent stores the GFA’s address as the mobile
node’s care-of address and sends a registration reply back. The reply message traverses the
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IPsec tunnel and arrives at the GFA. Then the reply message is forwarded to the mobile
node via the foreign agent to complete the home registration.
When the mobile node handoffs within the same foreign domain, regional registration
messages are delivered among the mobile node, a foreign agent, and the GFA. Since no traffic
is destined for the home network, the IPsec tunnel is not used for regional registration. In
other words, the security associations shared between the firewall and the GFA are not
affected by the mobile node’s handoffs within the same foreign domain.
The mobile node may transmit data packets to other correspondent nodes after a home
or regional registration. The solutions for each case are illustrated in Figure 21, 20 and 24,
and the corresponding data packet formats are shown in Figure 22, 23 and 25. GFA is the
abbreviation of the IP address of the gateway foreign agent. Other abbreviations are the
same as those explained in Section 2.6. The shaded portion in the packet formats represents
encrypted data.
Packets delivered from the correspondent node to the mobile node need to pass through
the Mobile IP forward tunnel and the IPsec tunnel to arrive at the foreign domain (Figure
21). In more detail, the correspondent node uses the shared secret to encrypt the payload
of a packet (Figure 22(a)). The packet is intercepted by the home agent and put into the
forward tunnel that is established from the home agent to the mobile node’s care-of address
(Figure 22 (b)). Note that the mobile node’s care-of address is the GFA’s address, not a
foreign agent’s address. Then the packet is relayed to the firewall. Before being transmitted
to the Internet, the packet is inserted to the IPsec tunnel (Figure 22(c)). It is the GFA that
removes the packet from the IPsec tunnel (Figure 22(b)) and the forward tunnel (Figure
22(a)) sequentially. Finally the packet (Figure 22(a)) is routed to the mobile node through
the foreign agent. Although there are many hosts along the way from the correspondent
node to the mobile node, because of the transport security mechanisms, no host can know
the information in the payload.
In the opposite direction, the mobile node uses the ESP transport mode security mech-
anisms to encrypt the payload of a packet (Figure 23 (a) and Figure 25(a)). The packet
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Figure 21: Packet delivery from a correspondent node to a mobile node in regional regis-
tration situation.
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Figure 22: Packet formats for data sent from a correspondent node to a mobile node in
regional registration situation: (a) packet sent by the correspondent node; (b) packet sent
by the home agent; (c) packet sent by the firewall.
scenario is quite simple, that is, it is the same as that shown in Figure 20. The packet enters
the IPsec tunnel at the GFA (Figure 23(b)) and exits at the firewall (Figure 23(a)). The
firewall directly transmits the packet to the correspondent node. However, the involvement
of a reverse tunnel makes the solution scenario a bit complicated, as shown in Figure 24.
Specifically, the packet is inserted into the reverse tunnel (Figure 25(b)) and then the IPsec
tunnel (Figure 25(c)) by the GFA, instead of the foreign agent. The packet is released from
the IPsec tunnel at the firewall (Figure 25(b)) and the reverse tunnel at the home agent
(Figure 25(a)). In the end, the correspondent node receives the packet (Figure 25(a)) and
decrypts it with the shared secret key.
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Figure 23: Packet formats for data sent from a mobile node to a correspondent node
without a reverse tunnel in regional registration situation: (a) packet sent by the mobile













Mobile IP reverse tunnel
Figure 24: Packet delivery from a mobile node to a correspondent node with a reverse
tunnel in regional registration situation.
Because the IPsec tunnel is set up between the firewall and the GFA, not between
the firewall and each foreign agent, the IPsec tunnel does not need to be re-set up when
the mobile node handoffs within the same foreign domain. Moreover, although the mobile
node changes its network attachment point because of handoffs, its home address remains
the same. The IPsec transport mode is set up between the correspondent node and the
home address of the mobile node, that is, the mobile node’s handoffs do not affect the
IP destination addresses in the IPsec transport security association. It is known that an
IPsec security association is uniquely identified by the triple (SPI, IP destination address,
security protocol identifier) [23, 52]. In our solution, this triple is not changed no matter
where the mobile node moves. In other words, the IPsec transport security associations
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Figure 25: Packet formats for data sent from a mobile node to a correspondent node with
a reverse tunnel in regional registration situation: (a) packet sent by the mobile node; (b)
packet sent from the care-of address; (c) packet sent by the GFA.
shared between the correspondent node and the mobile node do not need to be refreshed
for handoffs.
Briefly, when a mobile node is a new visitor to a foreign domain where foreign agents are
deployed hierarchically, an IPsec tunnel is necessary to be set up between the firewall and
the GFA. After that, no security association is required to be re-negotiated when the mobile
node moves within the same foreign domain and communicates with a same correspondent
node. Therefore, under this topology of foreign agents, the problem of security association
re-negotiation caused by the mobile node’s handoffs can be solved, and handoff performance
is not degraded by security achievements.
2.8 Analysis
In this section we analyze our firewall traversal solution from four aspects, security, handoffs,
packet overhead and scalability. We mainly discuss the solution explained in Section 2.6.
Because regional registration is a special case in Mobile IP, the following analysis is also
suitable to the solution described in Section 2.7.
2.8.1 Security
Our solution can fulfill the goal of Mobile IP security described by Zao et al. [58].
By means of an IPsec tunnel established between the firewall and the foreign agent,
the mobile node can pass through the firewall successfully and move freely in the Internet
without network connectivity loss. Additionally, Mobile IP itself achieves authentication
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services for registration messages, and transport mode operation implemented on the mobile
node and the correspondent node provides confidentiality services and end-to-end security
for data packets. That is, both registration and data transfer are secure.
For the home network, because of IPsec tunnel mode’s characteristics and implemen-
tation on the firewall, our solution does not bring any new attacks to the home network
when the mobile node is at abroad. For the foreign network, both the mobile node and the
foreign agent are located outside the foreign network’s firewall if the foreign network is also
firewall-protected. Therefore the internal foreign network is not exposed to any new attacks
caused by the visit of the mobile node. In a word, both the home and the foreign networks
are safe from attacks when the mobile node is away from home. Moreover, the foreign agent
can monitor IP header of the traffic to and from the mobile node and determine the mobile
node’s access according to some factors.
2.8.2 Handoffs
When a mobile node moves to another foreign network, the new foreign agent must build
an IPsec tunnel with the firewall. Compared with mobile hosts on the wireless networks,
the foreign agent and the firewall, which both usually are fixed hosts on the wired networks,
have more power provision, faster computation speed, wider bandwidth and lower link error
rate. As a result, they can establish an IPsec tunnel with much shorter time than mobile
hosts. If an IPsec tunnel is established between the firewall and the mobile node’s co-
located care-of address, as mentioned in Section 2.3, due to the mobile node’s capability,
the re-negotiation of the security association lowers handoff performance noticeably [3].
On the other hand, as explained in Section 2.7, because the mobile node uses its home
address, instead of its care-of address, in the transport security association, the security
association does not need to be refreshed whenever the mobile node changes its network
attachment point. In other words, the mobile node needs to do nothing about security
implementation for handoffs except that already defined in Mobile IP [41]. Such charac-
teristics can significantly save not only the mobile node’s power consumption but also the
handoff time.
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For above two reasons, our solution performs well for a mobile node’s handoffs.
2.8.3 Packet Overhead
Here we only discuss about packet overhead caused by employment of IPsec mechanisms.
We do not consider the overhead brought by Mobile IP forward and reverse tunneling
because these issues have already been written in [34, 41].
An ESP header specifies 4 bytes for Security Parameters Index, 4 bytes for Sequence
Number, 8 bytes for Initialization Vector, 1 byte for Pad Length and 1 byte for Next Header
[52]. In addition, we assume 7 bytes for Padding and 12 bytes for Authentication Trailer
[56]. So there are 37 bytes for an ESP header.
For transport mode, an ESP header is inserted immediately after the original IP header
of a data packet, it means that the overhead of 37 bytes is added. For tunnel mode, besides
an ESP header, a data packet is encapsulated with a new IP header. The minimum size of a
header in IPv4 is 20 bytes. Therefore the overhead for tunnel mode is an IP header plus an
ESP header, i.e., 57 bytes. In our solution, because both IPsec transport mode and tunnel
mode are applied, the total overhead added by IPsec mechanisms for a data packet is 94
bytes. Usually the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) is 1500 bytes in many networks.
Under this condition, the overhead due to security implementation in our solution is 6.27%.
2.8.4 Scalability
Usually one home network may have a certain number of mobile nodes and these mobile
nodes may visit different foreign networks at the same time. The firewall needs to set up
IPsec tunnels to those foreign networks that the mobile nodes are visiting, one tunnel to
one foreign agent. Correspondingly, one foreign network may have several mobile visitors
simultaneously. The foreign agent requires establishing IPsec tunnels to the home networks
that the visiting mobile nodes belong to, one tunnel to one home network. For example, in
Figure 26, mobile nodes MN11, MN12, and MN13 are from home network 1, and mobile
nodes MN21 and MN22 are from home network 2. Because both mobile nodes MN11 and
MN22 are visiting foreign network 2, the firewall 1 and firewall 2 need to set up IPsec
tunnels with FA2 respectively. Both mobile nodes MN12 and MN13 are staying in foreign
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network 3, thus the firewall 1 sets up one IPsec tunnel with FA3. Since there is only
one mobile node, MN21, inside foreign network 1, one IPsec tunnel is established between
firewall 2 and FA1. When all mobile nodes from the same home network leave the foreign
network, the tunnel between these two networks can be removed.
Internet
firewall 1





















Figure 26: An example of scalability analysis for the firewall traversal solution.
A firewall and a foreign agent may use Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [17, 22] to create
IPsec security associations. Each security association is independent, therefore, in theory, a
firewall can establish as many IPsec tunnels with other hosts as it desires, so can a foreign
agent. However, in practice, the capability of a foreign agent or a firewall, such as CPU
speed, memory space, etc., restricts the number of IPsec tunnels that can be set up.
In section 2.4, we assume that a mobile node is pre-configured a security association
with each correspondent node. However, if there are many correspondent nodes in the home
network, in order to reduce such configuration burden on the mobile node, a special host
may be set up in the home network. That is, before communicating with a correspondent
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node, the mobile node sends a request to the special host. Then the special host establishes
a security association between the mobile node and the correspondent node. The home
agent may also work as this special host. Certainly the mobile node and the correspondent
node may use IKE to establish security associations as well.
In brief, our solution can work well in the scenario with a number of home networks,
foreign networks and mobile nodes.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we describe an approach so that in Mobile IPv4 a mobile node can securely
access its firewall-protected home network as well as achieve end-to-end security with a
correspondent node. A foreign agent is deployed in our scenario due to its advantages and
necessities. IPsec security mechanisms are applied to accomplish the goal of Mobile IP
security. In more detail, an IPsec tunnel is established between the firewall and the foreign
agent for firewall traversal, and a transport security association is shared by the mobile
node and the correspondent node for end-to-end security. In addition, this approach can
also be applied to regional registration situation, that is, an IPsec tunnel is set up between
the firewall and the gateway foreign agent for firewall traversal. In regional registration
scenario, this solution can achieve that no security association needs to be refreshed if
the mobile node moves within the same foreign domain. Our solution does not change any
protocols and functions of network entities. Moreover, it is scalable. Therefore, our solution
is useful in the real world.
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CHAPTER III
SECURE FIREWALL TRAVERSAL IN THE MOBILE IP
AAA SYSTEM
3.1 Overview of the Mobile IP AAA System
Mobile IP is only a mobility technology. It does not specify any information about autho-
rization and usage when a mobile node roams in an administrative domain other than its
home domain. When a mobile node moves from its home domain to a foreign administrative
domain, it requires Internet services in order to continue its network connection. The service
provider in that domain needs to authenticate the mobile node, to make an authorization
decision and to maintain usage information. The services of Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting (AAA) [2, 33] can meet these challenges. Therefore, the IETF Network
Working Group suggests that Mobile IP work with the protocols of Authentication, Autho-
rization and Accounting [13]. This approach can help Mobile IP to be applied commercially
and broadly.
There are several AAA protocols. Among them, the RADIUS protocol [47] is the best-
known [31]. However, because RADIUS is not suitable to large and complex networks, the
DIAMETER protocol [10] is then designed to solve the problems appeared in RADIUS.
Here, we only use general AAA concepts and services, and we do not discuss any specific
AAA protocols.
In the Mobile IP AAA system, besides necessary mobility entities, two additional entities
are involved. One is an AAA server in the home domain of a mobile node and is called a
home AAA server (AAAH). The other is an AAA server in the foreign domain that the
mobile node is visiting and is called a foreign AAA server (AAAF). In general, the home
agent and the home AAA server of a mobile node are located inside the home domain,
while at least one foreign AAA server and several foreign agents are placed within the
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foreign domain that the mobile node is visiting.
3.1.1 The Security Model
In order to achieve the services of authentication, authorization and accounting, security
associations are necessary. We divide the security associations into two categories, essential
security associations and derived security associations. The essential security associations
must be pre-configured among the AAA servers and mobility entities while the derived se-
curity associations can be established with the help of the essential security associations and
keys. Obviously, the essential security associations are important. Four essential security














Figure 27: Trust model in the Mobile IP AAA system [40, 39].
The first security association, SA1, is shared between a mobile node and its home AAA
server. This significantly changes the security model of Mobile IP, which defines there
is one pre-existing security association between the mobile node and its home agent [40].
The second security association, SA2, is shared between the home AAA server and the
home agent to reduce the burden of the mobile node, that is, the mobile node does not
need to maintain an essential security association with its home agent. Although the home
AAA server and the foreign AAA server are located in different administrative domains,
they have to trust each other in order to rely on exchanged information. Therefore, one
security association, SA3, exists between them. Finally, because the foreign agent and the
foreign AAA server belong to the same administrative domain, it is naturally to assume that
they share a security association, SA4. Based on these four essential security associations,
mobility security associations between the mobile node and its home agent, and between
the mobile node and the current foreign agent can be derived [42].
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3.1.2 Registration Procedure
In the Mobile IP AAA system, when a mobile node just enters a foreign domain, it needs
to send a registration request message to its home domain. After the registration, it can
communicate with other correspondent nodes. Although the procedure of data routing in
the Mobile IP AAA system is the same as that in Mobile IP, the procedure of registration
is different.
There are two registration phases, initial registration and subsequent registration, in the
Mobile IP AAA system. Compared with a subsequent registration, an initial registration is
more important and time-consuming because it involves AAA servers and key distribution




























Figure 29: Initial registration reply flow for the Mobile IP AAA system [39].
In more detail, during an initial registration, a mobile node sends its credentials for
authentication via a foreign agent. Because the foreign agent shares a security association,
SA4, with the foreign AAA server, it can consult the foreign AAA server securely for
permission of resource allocation to the mobile node. If the foreign AAA server has enough
information for verifying the mobile node, it notifies the foreign agent directly. Or else, the
foreign AAA server has to deliver the mobile node’s credentials to the home AAA server.
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With the help of the essential security associations SA1 and SA3, the home AAA server
can authenticate the foreign AAA server and the mobile node. If the authentication is
successful, the home AAA server sends a registration reply back. Thus, the foreign AAA
server authorizes the mobile node to use the network resources in the foreign domain.
Meanwhile the home AAA server generates the following three keys:
• K1: a key shared between the mobile node and the foreign agent;
• K2: a key shared between the mobile node and the home agent;
• K3: a key shared between the foreign agent and the home agent.
With the help of the essential security associations, the home AAA server can encrypt
these keys and then securely deliver the keys K1 and K2 to the mobile node, the keys
K1 and K3 to the foreign agent, and the keys K2 and K3 to the home agent. Only after
the mobility entities get these keys, they can set up the derived security associations and
proceed to subsequent registrations. A subsequent registration is a standard Mobile IP
registration. Registration messages are transmitted only among the mobile node, the home
agent and the foreign agent. Neither the home AAA server nor the foreign AAA server is
involved during subsequent registration periods.
3.2 Challenges and Related Work
A firewall (FW) can be used to protect internal network resources, but it also brings chal-
lenges to the Mobile IP AAA system. Packets sent from untrusted external hosts are usually
dropped by the firewall. Therefore, when a mobile node leaves its firewall-protected home
domain and enters a foreign domain, the messages sent from the foreign domain cannot
pass through the firewall that protects the home domain if they fail the authentication. In
other words, the registration request messages cannot reach the home AAA server. Hence,
the home AAA server neither knows that there are registration requests from the mobile
node nor sends any replies and keys back. Due to no reply from the home AAA server, the
foreign AAA server cannot allow the mobile node to access its network resources. Without
the necessary keys generated by the home AAA server, the mobile node cannot establish
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the derived security associations with the home agent and the foreign agent to continue
subsequent registrations. Additionally, from the home domain’s point of view, because the
home AAA server and the home agent do not receive any registration request messages
from the mobile node, they cannot know the current location of the mobile node, that is,
packets on the way to the mobile node cannot be tunnelled by the home agent to their
correct destination. As a result, the objective of Mobile IP, seamless roaming, cannot be
achieved due to the intervention of firewalls.
It is known that firewalls are used widely. As explained in Section 3.1, the combination
of Mobile IP and AAA is inevitable. Therefore, it is important to solve the firewall traversal
problems in the Mobile IP AAA system. In recent years, several solutions [9, 14, 36, 54,
55, 58] have been proposed to solve the firewall traversal problem in Mobile IP. IPsec
mechanisms [26] are applied in these schemes. However, these proposals are only for Mobile
IP without the involvement of AAA. Although the firewall problem in the Mobile IP AAA
system is mentioned in [13] and [39], no detailed solution is given. Gustafson et al. give
an approach to this problem, but they also point out that their solution is limited because
both home AAA server and the home agent are globally reachable in their discussed layout
[15].
In the following, we present our proposal to solve the firewall traversal problems in the
Mobile IP AAA system. Our objective is that mobile users at abroad can securely have
access to their home network resources and that meanwhile firewalls can also carry out
their protection responsibilities. Our solution is intended to be practicable. Like [13] and
[40], our approach does not involve any specific AAA protocols, such as DIAMETER [10]
or RADIUS [47].
3.3 Network Architecture Model
The network architecture shown in Figure 30 is used for our discussion.
A firewall is deployed to protect the home administrative domain of a mobile node. The
firewall can monitor all traffic to and from the home domain and only allow authorized













Figure 30: Network scenario for firewall traversal in the Mobile IP AAA system.
Both the home AAA server and the home agent of the mobile node are located inside
the home domain. The home AAA server plays an important role in the Mobile IP AAA
system. If the home AAA server is located outside the firewall, although it is simpler for the
mobile node to send initial registration messages and receive keys, the home AAA server is
exposed to various attacks from the Internet and installation of some security software is
required for protection of the home AAA server. Normally the firewall can provide better
protection than such security software. Hence, in our discussion, the home AAA server is
located behind the firewall to reduce cost and avoid various attacks from the Internet. On
the other hand, the security of the firewall is also crucial. It is known that firewalls only run
as few programs as possible to prevent potential security holes [5]. Because the functions
of the home AAA server are complicated, from the security point of view, we suggest that
the home AAA server and the firewall run on separate physical machines. For the similar
reasons, the home agent is also placed on an independent machine behind the firewall.
The mobile node can roam seamlessly in its home domain as well as in the foreign
domain. In our discussion, the foreign administrative domain is not protected by a firewall,
and one foreign AAA server is located inside. The mobile node obtains a care-of address
from a foreign agent. The foreign agent is the default router of the mobile node, that is, all
traffic to and from the mobile node must pass through the foreign agent.
In addition, brokers, which are centralized agents and used for scalability of security
association establishment [40, 39], are omitted in Figure 30 because they do not affect our
discussion.
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3.4 The Security Model for Firewall Traversal
The key issue of the firewall traversal is that all traffic destined for the home administrative
domain has to be authenticated by the firewall. In other words, the entities outside the
firewall have to have some security relationships with the firewall so that messages sent
from these entities can pass through the firewall. As explained in Section 3.1, these security
relationships need to be based on the essential security associations and relevant keys.
Therefore, in this section, we discuss whether any additional essential security associations
and keys are necessary for the secure firewall traversal in the Mobile IP AAA system besides
those that have already been described in Section 3.1. For simplicity and practicality, our
objective is that the number of the additional essential security associations and keys is as
few as possible. Moreover, we explain how the derived security associations can be set up
between the firewall and the entities in the foreign domain.
3.4.1 The Essential Security Association between the Firewall and the Home
AAA Server
During an initial registration, among the entities in the foreign domain, only the foreign
AAA server sends a registration request message to the home domain. Before this request
enters the home domain, the firewall intercepts it and needs to verify the identity of the for-
eign AAA server. In the Mobile IP AAA system, there is one essential security association,
SA3, shared between the home AAA server and the foreign AAA server, that is, the home
AAA server trusts the foreign AAA server. The firewall should allow the messages sent
from the foreign AAA server to enter the home domain so that the home AAA server and
the foreign AAA server can communicate each other. Therefore, for the initial registration,
we only need to discuss how to establish a security relationship between the firewall and
the foreign AAA server.
Because of the essential security association SA3, the home AAA server must have
some information to authenticate the foreign AAA server, for example, the public key of
the foreign AAA server. Thus the firewall can be pre-configured with such information and
then use such information to verify the credentials of the foreign AAA server. In more
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detail, before the registration period, from the home AAA server, the firewall can obtain
the public keys of the foreign AAA servers that the home AAA server trusts. With the
help of the public keys, the firewall and the foreign AAA server can apply the IKE protocol
[17, 22] to negotiate IPsec security associations and then establish an IPsec tunnel between
each other, as shown in Figure 31. As a result, the messages sent from the foreign AAA
server can pass through the firewall safely. Because the foreign AAA server is not involved
during the subsequent registrations, the IPsec tunnel between the firewall and the foreign










Figure 31: Establishment of an IPsec tunnel between the firewall and the foreign AAA
server during an initial registration.
From above explanation, it is not necessary to have an essential security association
shared between the firewall and the foreign AAA server. However, the reason that the
firewall does not doubt the information obtained from the home AAA server is that the
firewall trusts the home AAA server, which means that there must be one essential security
association shared between the firewall and the home AAA server. We call this security
association SA5, as shown in Figure 32. Because the firewall and the home AAA server
belong to the same administrative domain, the security association SA5 can be implemented
easily.
3.4.2 The Secret Key Shared between the Firewall and the Foreign Agent
After the initial registration, the mobility entities follow the Mobile IP protocol for the


















Figure 32: The security model for firewall traversal in the Mobile IP AAA system.
delivers messages originally submitted by the mobile node to the firewall. We can apply
the approach proposed by Tang and Copeland [54] to accomplish our goal, that is, an IPsec
tunnel is established between the firewall and the foreign agent for the firewall traversal, as









Figure 33: Establishment of an IPsec tunnel between the firewall and the foreign agent
during a subsequent registration.
In order to establish an IPsec tunnel between the firewall and the foreign agent, one
shared security relationship is required between them. However Tang and Copeland [54] do
not mention how this shared security relationship is established. Here we propose that the
home AAA server help the firewall and the foreign agent to share one security relationship.
Specifically, during the initial registration, the home AAA server generates one additional
key, K4, and then distributes this key to the firewall and the foreign agent respectively.
With the key K4, the firewall and the foreign agent can use the IKE protocol [17, 22] to set
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up IPsec security associations.
Nevertheless, the key K4 must be distributed securely to prevent from being seen by
others, so the home AAA server has to encrypt this key before delivery. Because, as
explained above, one essential security association, SA5, is shared between the home AAA
server and the firewall, the home AAA server can encrypt the key K4 with the security
association SA5 and transmit that to the firewall. At the same time, the home AAA server
can send this shared key along with the keys K1 and K3 to the foreign agent. A detailed
description about the key distribution is given in Section 3.5.
3.4.3 Summary of the Security Model
Briefly, in order to solve the firewall traversal problems in the Mobile IP AAA system, we
propose that one additional essential security association, SA5, shared between the firewall
and the home AAA server should be required. Therefore, as shown in Figure 32, there is
a total of five essential security associations. During an initial registration, with the help
of SA5 and other essential security associations, one security association shared between
the firewall and the foreign AAA server can be derived and thus one IPsec tunnel can be
established between them. Furthermore, one additional key is necessary to be generated and
distributed so that another IPsec tunnel can be set up between the firewall and the foreign
agent during subsequent registrations. As a result, registration messages can securely pass
through the firewall, and the mobile node can complete its registration.
3.5 Key Generation and Distribution
According to the security model described in Section 3.4, necessary keys for registration as
well as for firewall traversal can be generated and distributed securely by the home AAA
server. Figure 34 shows the key distribution based on our security model.
Before an initial registration, the home AAA server can transmit the public key of the
foreign AAA server, denoted by P in Figure 34, to the firewall. Since the public key can
be known to everyone, encryption of a public key is not necessary. The home AAA server
may use the essential security association SA5 to keep the integrity of the public key P ,






















































Figure 34: Key distribution for firewall traversal in the Mobile IP AAA system.
server to the firewall does not take any registration time because this transmission can be
completed before the registration.
It is during the initial registration that the secret keys, i.e., K1, K2, K3 and K4, are
generated and distributed by the home AAA server. Because encryption is required for
secure delivery of secret keys, the home AAA server needs to encrypt these four secret
keys with the appropriate essential security associations. In Figure 34, (K)SA means that
the secret key K is encrypted with the security association SA. For the keys respectively
destined for the home agent and the mobile node, the distribution procedure is the same
as that described in [39], so it is not reiterated here. We mainly focus on the distribution
procedure of the new secret key K4.
The home AAA server encrypts the key K4 with the essential security association SA5
and sends that to the firewall. In the meantime, the home AAA server appends the key
K4 to the keys K1 and K3. Then it encrypts these three keys with the essential security
association SA3 and delivers that to the foreign AAA server. After being decrypted by the
foreign AAA server, these three keys are encoded with the essential security association
SA4 and transmitted to the foreign agent. With the help of the key K4, the foreign agent
and the firewall can establish an IPsec tunnel. Because the key K4 is delivered along with
other keys, the distribution of the key K4 does not cost any extra time.
48
In short, from the distribution procedure of the public key P and the secret key K4, we
can assert that our solution to the firewall traversal does not increase any extra delay for a
registration period. In other words, in our approach, it still takes only one Internet round
trip to complete an initial registration.
3.6 Control Message Flow
In this section we describe how the control messages flow among the AAA servers, the mo-
bility entities and the firewall to achieve the firewall traversal as well as registration. Once
a mobile node enters a foreign administrative domain, it needs to submit a registration
request to the home AAA server so that necessary keys can be distributed to the relevant
entities during an initial registration period. After that, the mobile node, the home agent
and the foreign agent follow the standard Mobile IP protocol to complete subsequent reg-
istrations. In the following, we give the detail description about the control message flow
according to this order.
3.6.1 Control Message Flow in an Initial Registration
Figure 35 shows the control message flow in an initial registration.
The mobile node sends a Mobile IP registration request along with the AAA key request
to the foreign agent. After being processed by the foreign agent, the request is forwarded
to the foreign AAA server. If the foreign AAA server has one shared essential security
association with the home AAA server, the firewall must have been pre-configured with the
public key of the foreign AAA server before the initial registration. Therefore, the foreign
AAA server and the firewall can negotiate to set up an IPsec tunnel. Then the registration
request is inserted into the IPsec tunnel by the foreign AAA server. Upon receipt of the
registration request, the firewall decrypts and verifies it. If the authentication is successful,
the registration request can enter the firewall and arrive at the home AAA server.
Once the home AAA server receives the registration request, it authenticates the mobile
node’s identity. If the home AAA server thinks that the mobile node’s credentials are valid,
it generates four secret keys, K1, K2, K3, and K4. The home AAA server encrypts the key
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Figure 35: Control message flow in an initial registration.
home AAA server delivers the registration request and the encrypted keys K2 and K3 to
the home agent. After receiving the registration reply from the home agent, the home AAA
server encodes the four keys with the appropriate essential security associations and sends
out that along with the registration reply. The reply message goes through the IPsec tunnel
from the firewall to the foreign AAA server. The foreign AAA server decrypts the keys K1,
K3 and K4 with the essential security association SA3, re-encrypts them with the essential
security association SA4, and then sends that to the foreign agent. However, the foreign
AAA server cannot know the key K2 because the key K2 is encrypted with the security
association SA1 shared by the home AAA server and the mobile node. The foreign agent
uses the essential security association SA4 to decrypt the keys K1, K3 and K4. Meanwhile,
the foreign agent relays the registration reply along with the encrypted keys K1 and K2 to
the mobile node. Consequently the four keys are securely distributed.
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3.6.2 Control Message Flow in a Subsequent Registration
After the keys are received by the relevant mobility entities during an initial registration, a
subsequent registration just follows standard Mobile IP protocol. A subsequent registration
does not involve any AAA servers. Figure 36 shows how the mobility entities and the
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Figure 36: Control message flow in a subsequent registration.
Upon receipt of a registration request from the mobile node, the foreign agent can
establish an IPsec tunnel with the firewall by using the shared key K4. The registration
request message passes through the IPsec tunnel and arrives at the firewall. The firewall
verifies the registration request message with the help of the IPsec mechanisms and relays
that to the home agent.
After processing the registration request, the home agent sends out a registration reply.
Because the destination of the reply message is outside the home domain, the reply message
enters the IPsec tunnel at the firewall and exits the tunnel at the foreign agent. The foreign
agent needs to decapsulate and decrypt the reply message with the IPsec mechanisms. In
the end, the mobile node receives the registration reply from the foreign agent.
After registration, the mobile node follows the Mobile IP protocol to communicate with
other correspondent nodes. The mobile node may use the solution proposed by Tang and
Copeland [54] to establish an IPsec transport security association with a correspondent
node and to achieve secure communication.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we use the essential security associations and the relevant keys to solve the
firewall traversal problem in the Mobile IP AAA system.
In our approach, one new essential security association, SA5, shared by the firewall and
the home AAA server is required. With the help of the security association SA5 and other
essential security associations, the firewall and the foreign AAA server can establish an
IPsec tunnel so that messages sent from the foreign domain during an initial registration
can pass through the firewall securely.
In addition, one new key, K4, is necessary to be generated by the home AAA server
during an initial registration. The key K4 is encrypted with the appropriate security asso-
ciations and delivered to the firewall and the foreign agent respectively. After getting this
shared key K4, the firewall and the foreign agent can set up an IPsec tunnel during the
subsequent registrations. Thus, the mobile node can traverse the firewall and have access
to its home domain.
Because the firewall and the home AAA server belong to the same administrative do-
main, the security association SA5 can be configured and maintained easily. The generation
and distribution of the key K4 do not cost any extra time in the registration period. More-
over, because of IPsec mechanisms, the firewall still performs its tasks of home domain
protection. That is, our solution does not bring any additional security holes. Therefore




MOBILE IP USE OF PRIVATE ADDRESSES IN AN RSIP
HOME NETWORK
4.1 Introduction to Use of Private Addresses
Because the number of hosts in the Internet has grown fast, the IP address space will be
exhausted and Internet Service Providers will be burdened with the amount of routing
overhead [46]. On the other hand, many large organizations, for example, banks, most of
time only exchange information within their internal networks. Therefore address allocation
for private networks [46] has been proposed. While the use of private address space brings
some advantages, such as conservation of the public IP address space and flexibility in
network design for organizations, it also brings some problems to hosts that only have
private addresses to get access to the Internet [46]. Specifically, because a private address is
not globally unique and not valid outside a private network, a host with a private address
cannot get access to public networks directly. Furthermore, routers in public networks
usually reject packets that use private addresses [46], so a packet with private addresses
cannot be delivered to a correct destination in public networks.
Network Address Translators (NAT) [51] are usually installed to map private addresses
to public addresses so that hosts in a private network can get access to the external network
transparently. There are two variations in traditional NAT, Basic Network Address Trans-
lation and Network Address Port Translation (NAPT) [51]. The function of basic NAT is
translation of IP addresses, and the function of NAPT is translation of IP addresses as well
as port numbers.
The advantage of NAT is that the address translation is transparent to hosts. However,
since a NAT router always examines and changes the header information in the network
layer, and possibly the transport layer, end-to-end packet integrity cannot be accomplished
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[51, 8]. Consequently, applications traversing a NAT router cannot be offered an end-to-end
security. But if a NAT router is an end-point of an IPsec tunnel, it can provide security to
packets transferring in the external realm [50].
Realm Specific IP (RSIP) [8] is viewed as an alternative to NAT. But it can maintain
end-to-end packet integrity. We briefly explain RSIP in the next section.
4.2 Overview of Realm Specific IP (RSIP)
RSIP [8] is designed to be an application layer protocol [7]. It provides services that allow
hosts in two different addressing realms to communicate each other [8]. For example, an
RSIP gateway can help hosts in a private IPv4 network to exchange messages with a public
network. Therefore, to some extent, RSIP is a way to lighten the address shortage burden on
IPv4 networks. Furthermore, the deployment of RSIP is not limited to only IPv4 networks.
RSIP can provide connectivity services between two different addressing realms, such as an
IPv6 network and an IPv4 network, or a non-IP network and an IP network [8].
It is known that end-to-end integrity becomes more and more important nowadays.
RSIP makes use of the tunnel concept to provide end-to-end integrity. In more detail, as
shown in Figure 37(a), one RSIP gateway N is located between two address spaces A and
B [8, 7, 35]. Thus the gateway N has two network interfaces, Na for space A and a pool
of addresses for space B. The hosts X and Y belong to spaces A and B respectively. An
RSIP tunnel exists between the host X and the gateway N . When the host X wants to
establish an end-to-end connection to the host Y , firstly it needs to request resources from
the gateway N and obtains address assignment, for example, the address Nb. Then the
gateway N binds the host X’s information with the assigned address Nb so that it can
correctly forward inbound traffic from Y to X. After that, the host X tunnels a packet, as
shown in Figure 37(b), to the gateway N . When receiving the packet, the gateway N , which
is the end point of the tunnel, removes the outer header and then delivers the decapsulated
packet to the host Y . In the reverse direction, upon receipt of a packet from the host Y ,
according to the binding information, the gateway N encapsulates the packet with an outer
header by using the address Na as the source and the address Xa as the destination. The
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gateway N then submits the encapsulated packet to the host X. A network consisting
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Figure 37: (a) RSIP architecture; (b) the format of a packet sent from the host X to the
host Y through the RSIP gateway N [8, 7, 35].
4.3 Problems for Use of Private Addresses in Mobile IP
Due to a shortage of IP addresses and burden of routing overhead [46], currently many
organizations apply private addresses in their internal networks. Nevertheless, the use of
private addresses brings additional challenges to Mobile IP.
In Mobile IP, if the home network of a mobile node is a private network, the mobile
node only has a private home address. When it stays in the home network and wants to
get access to a public network, the mobile node only needs to request a public address from
either a NAT router or an RSIP gateway that is located at the border of its home network.
However, as we have explained in Section 4.1, because a private address is not unique in a
public network, it can only be used within a private network. In other words, when a mobile
node goes abroad, it is not allowed to use its private home address in a public network.
Therefore, it is necessary for a mobile node to get a public home address when it is visiting
a foreign network. According to Mobile IP [41], the mobile node cannot contact its home
NAT router or RSIP gateway to get a public home address before it finishes the registration.
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Where a mobile node can get a public home address is a problem.
Because a private address cannot uniquely represent a host in a public network, a mobile
node needs some credentials to uniquely identify itself in a public network before it gets a
public home address. Which credentials can be used is another problem.
If a mobile node uses a foreign agent to register with its home agent, because both the
mobile node and the foreign agent are in the public network, neither of them should use
the mobile node’s private address in the IP header of registration messages. But the mobile
node does not have a public home address by that time. Without a proper IP address to
fill in the registration messages, the mobile node cannot complete the registration phase.
In-complete registration leads to loss of contact with its home agent.
Additionally, during the data routing phase, a mobile node uses the private addresses
to communicate with a correspondent node that is located inside the mobile node’s home
network. If such a packet is tunneled from the home agent to the foreign agent, the foreign
agent would most likely be confused by the private addresses in the packet’s IP header and
then drop the packet after it decapsulates the packet from the Mobile IP forward tunnel.
Therefore, when a mobile node from a private home network visits a public network, it
faces several problems of registration and data delivery.
4.4 Related Work
Several solutions have been proposed to solve the problems of a mobile node with a private
address. From the mobile node’s point of view, it may be assigned a private address by its
home network, a foreign network, or both.
When a mobile node visits a foreign network that uses private address spaces, data traffic
does not have any information of TCP/UDP port numbers that can be used to uniquely
translate a public address into a private care-of address [28]. Levkowetz and Vaarala [28]
apply MIP UDP tunneling so that a mobile node behind a NAT router in a foreign network
can communicate with public networks. Specifically, a Mobile IP UDP tunnel is established
during the registration period, and then data traffic goes through this tunnel from the home
agent to the mobile node.
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Since we mainly discuss the case that a mobile node has a private home address, we
focus on the relevant approaches to this issue in the following.
As explained in Section 4.3, a mobile node needs some credentials to uniquely represent
itself in a public network. Private IP Encapsulation (PIPE) is a method that a packet with
private addresses in the IP header may be encapsulated within another IP packet [43]. The
author argues that VPN-ID is unique globally and is used to identify a private network. In
Malinen’s solution, the combination of a mobile node’s private home address and its home
agent’s address is employed as the mobile node’s identification in public networks [30]. But
both Petri [43] and Malinen [30] do not describe how the mobile node registers with its
home agent.
If a mobile node uses a co-located care-of address, because the co-located care-of address
is public, Gupta and Montenegro [14] suggest that the mobile node use this co-located care-of
address to contact its home agent and to complete the registration. During communication
with a correspondent node, if the mobile node uses a reverse tunnel, it can encapsulate its
private home address with the public co-located care-of address so that a packet can be
routed to the correspondent node. Only the home agent and the correspondent node inside
the home network can see the private home addresses after the IP header containing the
co-located care-of address is stripped off.
On the other hand, some solutions, such as [18, 21, 29], deploy a foreign agent in their
scenarios. Although these proposals specify detail procedures for both registration and
data delivery, there are several drawbacks. First of all, the use of private addresses in
public networks violates the policy described in [46], though authors argue that the foreign
agent can use MAC addresses to identify mobile nodes if private address collision happens.
Secondly, the action of the foreign agent is changed. In Mobile IP, the foreign agent should
play a passive role [41]. However, in [18, 21, 29], the foreign agent is active to request the
home agent to assign a public address to a mobile node without notifying the mobile node.
This action has some security problems. Because there is no required authentication for
this request message, a hacker can easily pretend to be the foreign agent. Even worse, a
hacker can use up the resources of public addresses in the home network. Thirdly, it is not
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secure that the home agent assigns a public address to a mobile node upon receipt of a
request from a correspondent node. Since usually there is no security association between
the home agent and a correspondent node, the resources of public addresses owned by the
home agent can be exhausted by a hacker without any difficulty. Finally, the request of a
public address for a mobile node during the data transfer period increases delay between
two end users.
4.5 Network Scenario and Assumptions













Figure 38: Network scenario for Mobile IP use of private addresses in an RSIP home
network.
Unlike the scenario described in [28], we assume that the home network, not the foreign
network, of a mobile node uses a private IP address space, that is, each host within the
home network is assigned a private IP address. Furthermore, different from the network
architecture explained in [18, 21, 29], one RSIP gateway, not a NAT router, is located at
the border of the home network. The RSIP gateway has two network interfaces, one private
address for the home network and a pool of public addresses for the external network. As
far as we know, the research on the integration of RSIP and Mobile IP is under discussion
[8], but there is no published paper on this research area as yet.
A home agent runs separately from the RSIP gateway. When a mobile node leaves
its home, it needs to contact its home agent frequently from the public network. Hence,
the home agent is required to communicate with the public network from time to time.
It is inconvenient for the home agent to acquire a public address from the RSIP gateway
whenever it needs to set up a new connection with the public network. On the other hand,
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since only a few home agents are located in the home network, it does not take many public
addresses even if each home agent is assigned a public address. Therefore we assume that
each home agent has a static public address in addition to a private address. We also allow
the home agent to lease more than one public address from the RSIP gateway, which is
permitted by the RSIP protocol [8].
A mobile node can move seamlessly in its home network as well as in a foreign network.
The mobile node only has one private home address. It is pre-configured with both public
and private addresses of its home agent. If the mobile node stays at home, it uses the home
agent’s private address as the destination for sending packets to its home agent. Otherwise,
it uses the home agent’s public address as the destination.
A correspondent node outside the home network has a public address. Nevertheless
a correspondent node within the home network only has a private address. When both
a correspondent node and a mobile node belong to the same home network, only private
addresses are used for information exchange.
The foreign network in our discussion uses public address space, and the mobile node
obtains a care-of address from the foreign agent, which is different from the network scenario
illustrated in [14] and [28].
4.6 Design Principles and Objective
To be practical, our approach has to follow some basic principles.
Because a private address is not globally unique in the public network, use of private
addresses in the public address space is ambiguous. As a result, packets with private
addresses are usually dropped by routers in the public network and cannot be routed to
the correct destination [46]. Additionally, from a security point of view, upon receipt of
packets with private addresses, network entities in the public address space may believe
that these packets are caused by an IP spoofing attack. Therefore, in our approach, no
private addresses are allowed to be used in the public network.
Another principle is that no additional security issues arise from our design. The more
complicated the design is, the more possible it is to have security holes. Thus our approach
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should modify the Mobile IP and RSIP protocols as little as possible. In particular, in order
to comply with this principle, the following restrictions should be satisfied:
• No additional network entities, besides those that are necessary for the Mobile IP and
RSIP protocols.
• No role change of the network entities. For example, the foreign agent plays a passive
role and the home agent plays a reactive role in the Mobile IP registration procedure
[41].
• No additional control messages exchanged among network entities.
• No change of security requirements. For example, it is still mandatory to authenticate
registration messages exchanged between the home agent and the mobile node [41].
Briefly, our objective is to enable a mobile node with only a private home address to com-
municate with other hosts while the mobile node is visiting a public network. Additionally,
the following two principles must be obeyed:
• no access to private addresses in the public address space;
• no additional security holes to those already existing in Mobile IP and RSIP.
4.7 Design Considerations
Because a private home address can neither uniquely identify a mobile node nor directly
be used for communications in the public address space, what we need to solve is how the
mobile node identifies itself and obtains an appropriate address in the public network. In
the following, we explain the problems and the corresponding solutions in detail.
4.7.1 Identification of a Mobile Node
A major problem for use of private addresses in Mobile IP is that the private home address
cannot be used to uniquely identify a mobile node in the public network. In other words,
the mobile node needs some unique credentials in the public network. As mentioned in
Section 4.4, Petri uses an identifier called VPN-ID to recognize a mobile node [43], and
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Malinen employs the combination of a mobile node’s private home address and its home
agent’s public address to distinguish the mobile node [30]. However, neither of them has
been used widely. Currently the Network Access Identifier (NAI) [1] is used broadly. In our
solution, we apply NAI to identify a mobile node in the public network.
4.7.2 Public Home Address Assignment to a Mobile Node
When a mobile node moves in the public network, it needs a public home address for
communications with a correspondent node. The problem is which network entity can
assign a public home address to the mobile node. According to the Mobile IP protocol
[41], the mobile node is allowed to contact the foreign agent and the home agent during the
registration period, so it can obtain the public home address only from either the foreign
agent or the home agent.
If a public home address is assigned by the foreign agent, because the address prefix
of the foreign network is different from that of the mobile node’s home network, such
assignment may cause confusion in network management. Also for the same reason, if the
previous foreign agent assigns the public home address to the mobile node, when the mobile
node moves to another foreign network, the new foreign agent may think that the mobile
node is a hacker that is using an IP spoofing attack. Thus the new foreign agent may
disallow the mobile node to access its network resources. Additionally, in Mobile IP, the
authentication between the foreign agent and the mobile node is optional, not required [41].
So if there is no security association shared between the foreign agent and the mobile node,
the foreign agent may not assign a public home address to the mobile node, or else the
resources of public IP addresses in the foreign network can be used up easily by a hacker.
In consequence, the assignment of a public home address to the mobile node cannot be
performed by the foreign agent.
The other choice for address assignment is the home agent. In the following we explain
why the home agent is capable of this task. Firstly and the most important, because a
security association between the mobile node and the home agent is mandatory in Mobile
IP [41], the home agent can verify the mobile node identity and protect the public address
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resources of the home network as well. If authentication is successful, because the RSIP
protocol allows a host to lease more than one public address [8], the home agent can lease a
public address from the RSIP gateway and then assign this address to the mobile node. The
home agent inserts this public address in the registration reply message. With the help of
mobile-home authentication extension appended to the registration reply message, this pub-
lic home address assigned to the mobile node cannot be modified by hackers during packet
delivery. Consequently, no new security problems arise from such assignment. Secondly,
since the assignment of the mobile node’s public home address is inserted in the registration
message, neither additional control messages nor time delay is required. Finally, because
the prefix of the assigned public home address is the same as that of the home network, it
is convenient for network management. In short, it is a good choice to use the home agent
to assign a public home address to the mobile node.
4.7.3 Source IP Address for the Registration Request Message
According to the principles described in Section 4.6, private IP addresses cannot be used
in the public network. Therefore before the mobile node gets a public home address, it
needs one appropriate IP address as the source address in order to deliver a registration
request message from itself to the foreign agent. Mobile IP protocol specifies that 0.0.0.0
can be used as the source address if the mobile node does not know its IP address [41].
Although the case of a mobile node with an unknown IP address is different from that of a
mobile node with a private home address, we can still apply this method. In other words,
the address 0.0.0.0 can be used as the source IP address in the registration request message
by the mobile node. As a result, the problem of source address for the registration request
message can be solved without modification of Mobile IP protocol.
4.7.4 Address Issues for Data Transfer
After a mobile node finishes registration, it has a public home address and can communicate
with a correspondent node. Depending on the location of the correspondent node, there are
two cases, that is, the correspondent node is either inside or outside the home network.
If the correspondent node is located outside the home network, both the mobile node
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and the correspondent node use public IP addresses for communications, and the packets
transferred between them follows the Mobile IP and RSIP protocols.
However, if the correspondent node is located inside the home network, as described
in the Section 4.5, the private addresses are used between the correspondent node and the
mobile node. When a packet sent from the correspondent node is intercepted by the home
agent, in order to prevent private addresses from being accessed by the foreign agent in the
public network, the home agent has to put one IP header outside the packet before it inserts
this packet into the forward tunnel. Since this packet is delivered from the home agent to
the mobile node, the home agent’s public address may be used as the source and the mobile
node’s public home address may be used as the destination in the outer IP header. After
that, the home agent puts the encapsulated packet into the forward tunnel.
In the opposite direction, similarly, a packet sent from the mobile node to the corre-
spondent node also has to be encapsulated with an outer IP header to keep the foreign
agent from accessing private addresses. Because the correspondent node does not have a
public address and both the correspondent node and the home agent are located in the
same network, the mobile node may use its own public home address as the source and its
home agent’s public address as the destination to encapsulate an original packet. Then this
packet is routed to the home agent according to the Mobile IP and RSIP protocols. Finally
this packet is decapsulated by the home agent and delivered to the correspondent node.
Therefore, for the case that the correspondent node is located inside the home network,
it is necessary to build one tunnel between the public address of the home agent and that
of the mobile node to keep private addresses from being accessed in the public network. We
call this tunnel the mobile-home tunnel.
4.8 Procedures of Registration and Data Transfer
In this section, we apply the methods described above to achieve our objective. We present
the whole procedures as well as the packet formats in detail. Because a mobile node first
registers its care-of address and then communicates with a correspondent node when it
visits a foreign network, our explanation is given according to this order.
63
4.8.1 Registration Procedure
When a mobile node visits a foreign network, it sends a registration request and then
receives a registration reply. The format of a registration request and that of a registration
reply are shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40 respectively, and our solutions are highlighted
with the yellow color.
As explained in Section 4.7.3, because the mobile node only has a private home address,
in the IP header of the packet that contains the registration request message as payload,
the mobile node puts the IP address 0.0.0.0 as the source and the IP address of the foreign
agent as the destination. In the registration request message, the mobile node fills in the
Home Address field with 0.0.0.0 and the Home Agent field with the public address of the
home agent. Since we use NAI to identify a mobile node in the public network, the mobile
node also inserts its NAI extension before the mobile-home authentication extension. After
being processed by the foreign agent, the registration request message is delivered to the
home agent through the RSIP gateway.
Type Code Lifetime
Home Address: 0.0.0.0




mobile node's NAI extension
mobile-home authentication extension
Figure 39: Format of registration request message.
According to the mobile node’s NAI extension, the home agent can recognize the mobile
node. The home agent leases a public address from the RSIP gateway. Because this address
will be the public home address of this mobile node, the home agent binds this address with
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the record of this mobile node together and then fills this address in the Home Address field
of the registration reply message. The home agent puts its public address in the Home Agent
field as well. Moreover, the mobile node’s NAI extension and the mobile-home extension
are required to the registration reply message [11]. On the receipt of the registration reply
message, the mobile node obtains its public home address.
Type Code Lifetime
Home Address: the assigned public address to the mobile node
Home Agent: home agent's public address
other extensions
Identification
mobile node's NAI extension
mobile-home authentication extension
Figure 40: Format of registration reply message.
4.8.2 Data Transfer Procedure
A mobile node can communicate with a correspondent node after registration. In accordance
with the location of a correspondent node, first we describe the procedure of communications
between a mobile node and an external correspondent node, then we discuss that between
a mobile node and an internal correspondent node. Moreover, for each case, there are two
situations for packets sent from the mobile node to the correspondent node, i.e., direct
delivery and use of a reverse tunnel.
The detailed data transfer procedures as well as the corresponding packet formats for
each situation are shown in Figure 41 to Figure 46. The abbreviations shown in these figures
are listed as follows:
• HApub: the public address of the home agent;
• HApri: the private address of the home agent;
• MNpub: the public home address of the mobile node;
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• MNpri: the private home address of the mobile node;
• COA: the care-of address of the mobile node;
• CN : the address of the correspondent node;
• Npri: the private address of the RSIP gateway.
4.8.2.1 The Correspondent Node outside the Home Network
Because the correspondent node is located outside the home network, as explained in Section
4.7.4, public addresses are used in the packets transferred between the correspondent node
and the mobile node.
When the correspondent node sends a data packet (Figure 41 (a)), it puts its IP address
as the source and the mobile node’s public home address as the destination (Figure 41
(b.1)). The packet is intercepted by the home agent after it passes through the RSIP
gateway (Figure 41 (b.2)). The home agent follows the Mobile IP protocol and puts the
packet into the forward tunnel. At the same time, according to the RSIP protocol, the
home agent tunnels this packet to the RSIP gateway (Figure 41 (b.3)). The RSIP gateway
decapsulates the packet and delivers it to the public network (Figure 41 (b.4)). Upon
receipt of the packet, the foreign agent removes it from the forward tunnel and sends it to
the mobile node (Figure 41 (b.5)).
In the opposite direction, if a reverse tunnel is not used, the packet format is quite simple.
The mobile node just puts its public home address as the source and the correspondent
node’s address as the destination and then sends the packet (Figure 42).
However, the whole procedure is much complicated with use of a reverse tunnel (Figure
43 (a)). The original packet (Figure 43 (b.1)) is sent by the mobile node and inserted into
the reverse tunnel by the foreign agent (Figure 43 (b.2)). The packet has to pass through
the RSIP gateway before it reaches the home agent (Figure 43 (b.3)). The home agent
decapsulates the packet from the RSIP tunnel and the reverse tunnel sequentially. Because
the destination, i.e., the correspondent node, is outside the home network, the packet has























Figure 41: (a) Procedure of a packet delivered from an external correspondent node to a
mobile node; (b) the corresponding packet formats.
After being decapsulated from the RSIP tunnel, the packet leaves for the correspondent
node (Figure 43 (b.5)).
4.8.2.2 The Correspondent Node inside the Home Network
When the correspondent node is located inside the home network, as explained in Section
4.7.4, in order for the private addresses not to be accessed in the public network, one
mobile-home tunnel is required.
An original packet (Figure 44 (b.1)) with the private addresses sent by the correspondent
node is intercepted by the home agent (Figure 44 (a)). Because the mobile node has already
moved outside the home network, the home agent has to put the packet through the mobile-
home tunnel. Then the home agent puts the packet through the forward tunnel and the
RSIP tunnel (Figure 44 (b.2)). The packet is decapsulated from the RSIP tunnel and
transmitted to the public network by the RSIP gateway (Figure 44 (b.3)). On arrival at







MN's home network foreign network
(a)
(b)
Figure 42: (a) Procedure of a packet delivered from a mobile node to an external corre-
spondent node without a reverse tunnel; (b) the corresponding packet formats.
(Figure 44 (b.4)).
When the mobile node sends a data packet to the correspondent node (Figure 45 (a)),
if a reverse tunnel is not used, the mobile node uses the public addresses to encapsulate
the private addresses (Figure 45 (b.1)). At the entrance of the home network, the RSIP
gateway tunnels the packet to the home agent (Figure 45 (b.2)). Then the home agent
removes two IP headers, one from the RSIP tunnel and the other from the mobile-home
tunnel. Finally the original packet (Figure 45 (b.3)) heads for the correspondent node.
However, if a reverse tunnel is used between the foreign agent and the home agent
(Figure 46 (a)), after the packet is inserted into the mobile-home tunnel by the mobile node
(Figure 46 (b.1)), it is put into the reverse tunnel by the foreign agent (Figure 46 (b.2)). On
the arrival of the RSIP gateway, the packet is encapsulated with another IP header (Figure
46 (b.3)) and delivered to the home agent. Upon receipt of the packet, the home agent
releases the packet from three tunnels, i.e., the RSIP tunnel, the reverse tunnel and the
mobile-home tunnel. Finally the packet (Figure 46 (b.4)) is received by the correspondent
node.
4.9 Solution to Mobile User Traversal of Firewall and RSIP
Gateway
Usually a firewall and an RSIP gateway are installed in one machine and deployed on






















Figure 43: (a) Procedure of a packet delivered from a mobile node to an external corre-
spondent node with a reverse tunnel; (b) the corresponding packet formats.
combination of a firewall and an RSIP gateway. In the network scenario shown in Figure
47, when a mobile node visits a foreign network, it faces the problems brought by the firewall
as well as the RSIP gateway, which are respectively described in Section 2.1 and Section
4.3. Therefore, we combine the corresponding solutions proposed by Tang and Copeland
[54, 53] to solve these problems. The new solution can enable a mobile node that only has
a private home address to securely access its home network and communicate with other
correspondent nodes. In the following, we give a description of this new solution. We still
follow the order of registration and data transfer.
4.9.1 Registration Procedure
The registration procedure is shown in the Figure 48. In a registration request message,
the mobile node puts the IP address 0.0.0.0 in the Home Address field and its NAI in the
extension field. The format of the registration request message is the same as that shown
in Figure 39. In order for the registration request message to pass through the firewall, the
foreign agent sets up an IPsec tunnel with the FW/RSIP. After being de-tunneled by the
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CN->MNpri payload
HApri->Npri HApub->COA HApub->MNpub CN->MNpri payload













Figure 44: (a) Procedure of a packet delivered from an internal correspondent node to a


















Figure 45: (a) Procedure of a packet delivered from a mobile node to an internal corre-
spondent node without a reverse tunnel; (b) the corresponding packet formats.
FW/RSIP, the registration request message is delivered to the home agent.
After verifying the registration request message, the home agent sends an assign request
message [7] to the FW/RSIP to lease a public address for the mobile node. The home agent
puts the assigned public address to the Home Address field in the registration reply message,
as shown in the Figure 40. The registration reply message is inserted into the IPsec tunnel
by the FW/RSIP for security reasons. The foreign agent removes the registration reply
from the IPsec tunnel and transmits that to the mobile node. So far the mobile node gets



















Figure 46: (a) Procedure of a packet delivered from a mobile node to an internal corre-












Figure 47: Network scenario for the combination of firewall and RSIP gateway.
4.9.2 Data Transfer Procedure
A mobile node may communicate with other correspondent nodes after registration. It is
necessary and important for a mobile node that is visiting a foreign network to exchange
information with a correspondent node that is located inside the home network. Moreover,
the communication between these two nodes involves all mechanisms for firewall traversal
and access to the private home network, which are described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.
Therefore, in the following we detail the procedure and the corresponding packet formats for
the communication between the mobile node and the internal correspondent node, shown
in Figure 49, 50, and 51.




















Figure 48: Control message flow in FW/RSIP network scenario.
• Mobile-home tunnel: a tunnel that is established between the public home address of
the mobile node and the public address of the home agent.
• Mobile IP forward tunnel: a tunnel that is established from the public address of the
home agent to the care-of address of the mobile node.
• Mobile IP reverse tunnel: a tunnel that is established from the care-of address of the
mobile node to the public address of the home agent.
• RSIP tunnel: a tunnel that is established between the private address of the home
agent and the private address of the FW/RSIP.
• IPsec tunnel: a tunnel that is established between the foreign agent and the public
address of the FW/RSIP and uses IPsec mechanisms.
For packet formats shown in Figure 49, 50, and 51, besides the abbreviations listed in
Section 4.8.2, Npub and Npri respectively represent the public address and the private
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address of the FW/RSIP. The shaded portion in the packet formats indicates encrypted
data.
4.9.2.1 Packet Delivery from a Correspondent Node to a Mobile Node
The detail procedure for a packet delivery from a correspondent node to a mobile node is
shown in Figure 49 (a) and the corresponding packet formats are shown in Figure 49 (b).
Because both the mobile node and the correspondent node belong to the same network,
they use their private addresses to communicate each other. After its payload is encrypted,
a packet can be sent from the correspondent node to the mobile node (Figure 49 (b.1) ).
Based on the Mobile IP protocol [41], the packet is routed to the home agent. Because of
the reason explained in Section 4.7.4 and the requirement of Mobile IP, the packet is put
into the mobile-home tunnel and then the Mobile IP forward tunnel. The encapsulated
packet passes through the RSIP tunnel and arrives at the FW/RSIP (Figure 49 (b.2)).
The packet is de-tunnelled from the RSIP tunnel and put into the IPsec tunnel by the
FW/RSIP (Figure 49 (b.3)) so that hosts in the Internet cannot know any information
about the original packet. On arrival at the foreign agent, the packet is released from the
IPsec tunnel and the Mobile IP forward tunnel (Figure 49 (b.4)). Then it is delivered to
the mobile node. The mobile node firstly decapsulates the packet from the mobile-home
tunnel. After that, it uses the secret shared with the correspondent node to decrypt the
packet and gets the original packet.
4.9.2.2 Packet Delivery from a Mobile Node to a Correspondent Node
In the opposite direction, if no Mobile IP reverse tunnel is used, as shown in Figure 50 (a),
a packet is encrypted and inserted into the mobile-home tunnel by a mobile node (Figure
50 (b.1)). Then the packet passes through the IPsec tunnel from the foreign agent to
the FW/RSIP (Figure 50 (b.2)). After being released from the IPsec tunnel, the packet is
inserted to the RSIP tunnel (Figure 50 (b.3)). The packet leaves for the correspondent node
after it is de-tunnelled from the RSIP tunnel and the mobile-home tunnel (Figure 50 (b.4)).
Because of the IPsec security mechanisms, only the correspondent node can successfully
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Figure 49: (a) Procedure of a packet delivery from an internal correspondent node to a
mobile node in FW/RSIP network scenario; (b) the corresponding packet formats.
However, if a reverse tunnel is used (Figure 51 (a)), after being encrypted and inserted
to the mobile-home tunnel (Figure 51 (b.1) ), the packet enters the reverse tunnel before it
enters the IPsec tunnel (Figure 51 (b.2)). The FW/RSIP releases the packet from the IPsec
tunnel and lets it tunnel to the home agent (Figure 51 (b.3)). The home agent removes
three outer IP headers from the packet and delivers it to the correspondent node (Figure
51 (b.4)). Because of the IP security mechanisms, no host along the way from the mobile
node to the correspondent node can know the payload information of the packet.
4.10 Analysis
In this section, we mainly analyze the solution to private home network access, which is


























FA->Npub ESP hdr MNpri->CNpri payloadESP hdrMNpub->HApub
MNpri->CNpri payloadESP hdrMNpub->HApub
MNpri->CNpri payloadESP hdr
Figure 50: (a) Procedure of a packet delivery from a mobile node to an internal correspon-
dent node without a reverse tunnel in FW/RSIP network scenario; (b) the corresponding
packet formats.
scalability. Because the solution explained in Section 4.9 is just the combination of the
firewall traversal solution [54] and the private home network access solution [53], which
are described in Section 2.6 and Section 4.8 respectively, its analysis is the combination of
Section 2.8 and this section.
4.10.1 Security
Because our solution follows the principles described in Section 4.6, our solution does not
bring any additional security holes. In more detail, there is no new network entity in our
































Figure 51: (a) Procedure of a packet delivery from a mobile node to an internal corre-
spondent node with a reverse tunnel in FW/RSIP network scenario; (b) the corresponding
packet formats.
role of any network entities. For registration, our solution does not create any new control
messages. All the control messages, such as registration request, registration reply, assign
request, and assign response, that we use are defined in the Mobile IP protocol and the RSIP
protocol. Although we modify the registration request and registration reply messages, the
modifications are allowed by Mobile IP. For data transfer, we introduce a new mobile-home
tunnel. Because the security association between a mobile node and its home agent is
required, the mobile node and its home agent can apply security mechanisms to protect the
mobile-home tunnel from being hijacked or redirected. Therefore, our solution is secure.
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4.10.2 Handoffs
In our solution, after leaving its home network, the mobile node needs to request a public
home address when it visits the first foreign network. After the mobile node gets a public
home address, it does not need to request any home addresses when it stays abroad. Al-
though a new mobile-home tunnel is proposed for data delivery, the two end-points, i.e.,
the public home address of the mobile node and the public address of the home agent, do
not change for handoffs. Therefore, the mobile node only follows the Mobile IP protocol for
handoffs. In other words, our solution has no influence on handoffs.
4.10.3 Packet Overhead
Although a Mobile IP forward tunnel, a Mobile IP reverse tunnel, and an RSIP tunnel
bring some overhead to packets, we do not discuss that here. We only consider the packet
overhead brought by our solution.
When a mobile node communicates with a correspondent node that is located outside
the home network, data delivery follows the Mobile IP protocol and the RSIP protocol.
However, when a mobile node communicates with a correspondent node that is located
inside the home network, a mobile-home tunnel is necessary for data delivery. In other
words, one additional IP header is required. The minimum size of an IPv4 header is 20
bytes. Suppose a packet size is 1500 bytes, which is the Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) in many networks. Under the circumstances, the overhead of our solution is 1.33%.
4.10.4 Scalability
In our solution, whenever a mobile node leaves its home network, it needs a public home
address. When a mobile node returns its home network, it puts its public home address
back. The public address resources of the home network are limited. If the number of mobile
nodes outside the home network is more than the number of available public addresses owned
by the home network, some of the mobile nodes cannot communicate with other hosts. In
other words, our solution is limited by the public address resources of the home network.
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4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present an approach that a mobile node with a private home address
can communicate with a correspondent node when the mobile node stays outside its home
network. In our scenario, an RSIP gateway is located at the border of the private home
network, and a foreign agent that assigns a care-of address to the mobile node is placed
in the public network. Our approach follows two principles, that is, no access to private
addresses in the public network and no additional security issues. Our design consists
of four parts. First, NAI is applied to identify the mobile node in the public network;
second, the public home address of the mobile node is assigned by the home agent during
the registration period; third, the IP address 0.0.0.0 is used as the source address for the
registration request message; and finally, a mobile-home tunnel is required for data transfer
when a correspondent node also belongs to the home network.
Our solution can be extended to solve the problems for the situation that the combi-
nation of firewall and RSIP gateway is located at the entrance of a mobile node’s private
home network. We combine our solution with the firewall traversal solution [54]. This new
solution can enable a mobile node to pass through the firewall and to securely communicate
with other hosts when the mobile node stays abroad.
Our solution is secure. It has no influence on handoffs and brings little packet overhead.
But its scalability is limited by the public address resources of a mobile node’s home network.





In this thesis, the challenges that prevent Mobile IP from being widely used are investigated
and the corresponding solutions are proposed. We mainly discuss how a mobile node can
access its home network securely. We summarize the three research topics as follows.
5.1 Mobile IP Secure Firewall Traversal with the Deploy-
ment of Foreign Agents
The first research topic solves the firewall traversal problems in Mobile IP. When the home
network of a mobile node is protected by a firewall, the mobile node cannot access the home
network if it fails the authentication by the firewall. Thus use of Mobile IP is restricted by
firewalls.
Our novel solution is presented in Chapter 2 to achieve firewall traversal in Mobile IP.
Specifically, an IPsec tunnel is established between the firewall and the foreign agent for
firewall traversal, and an IPsec transport security association is shared by the mobile node
and a correspondent node for end-to-end security.
If a number of foreign agents are deployed hierarchically, an IPsec tunnel is set up be-
tween the firewall and a gateway foreign agent, instead of a foreign agent. Therefore, no
security association needs to be refreshed if the mobile node moves within these hierar-
chical foreign agents, which means that handoff performance is not degraded by security
achievements.
Furthermore, our solution is secure and scalable.
5.2 Secure Firewall Traversal in the Mobile IP AAA Sys-
tem
In the second research topic, which is described in Chapter 3, we research further on firewall
traversal problems. For the situation that Mobile IP is combined with the services of
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Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA), a new security model and a new
key distribution method are developed so that a mobile node can pass through the firewall
that protects the home domain of the mobile node.
In the new security model, a new essential security association shared between the
home AAA server and the firewall is required. With this essential security association, the
firewall can trust the home AAA server. From the home AAA server, the firewall gets some
information about the foreign AAA server. The firewall uses such information to set up
an IPsec tunnel with the foreign AAA server so that the mobile node’s initial registration
request message can traverse the firewall. Because the firewall and the home AAA server
belong to the same administrative domain, it is easy to implement and maintain this new
essential security association.
In addition, we propose that a new key be necessary for firewall traversal. This key is
shared by the firewall and the foreign agent that is the default router of the mobile node.
During an initial registration period, the home AAA server generates this new key, encrypts
it with the appropriate essential security associations, and distributes it to the firewall and
the foreign agent respectively. The firewall and the foreign agent use this key to set up
IPsec tunnel for the mobile node’s messages to pass through the firewall. Because this new
key is delivered with other keys, its distribution does not cost extra time in the registration
period.
Because of the easy implementation for the new essential security association and no
extra distribution time for the new key, our proposal is practicable.
5.3 Mobile IP Use of Private Addresses in an RSIP Home
Network
In Chapter 4, we mainly discuss the problems for use of private addresses in Mobile IP and
design a secure and useful scheme. Our solution can achieve a mobile node with a private
home address to access its home network as well as the Internet when it is away from home.
In a public network, a private home address cannot be used to uniquely identify a
mobile node and to communicate with other correspondent nodes. Therefore, we suggest
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that Network Access Identifier (NAI) be used as a unique identification of the mobile node
in a public network. The reason for the public home address assignment to a mobile node by
its home agent is explained. The detailed formats for registration messages are presented.
Specifically, the mobile node’s NAI and IP address 0.0.0.0 are included in a registration
request message. A registration reply message contains a public address that is assigned to
the mobile node. In addition, to prevent private addresses from being accessed in a public
network, we propose a tunnel should be established between the public home address of the
mobile node and the public address of the home agent.
Furthermore, for the network scenario that a private home network is protected by a
firewall, which is used widely, our approach can be extended to achieve a mobile node in
such network scenario to securely get access to its home network.
The analysis shows that our solution is secure. It has no influence on a mobile node’s
handoffs and brings little packet overhead.
5.4 Summary
In conclusion, our original research can enable a mobile node to securely and efficiently
access its home network as well as the Internet in Mobile IP. It brings no security holes to
the home network or a foreign network. Our approach can be implemented and maintained
easily. Therefore, our research can help Mobile IP to be used widely and commercially.
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